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The dynamics of social assistance receipt: 
measurement and modelling issues, with an 
application to Britain Non-technical summary 
 
There is interest in learning about the factors associated with the chances of moving into 
receipt or of moving off receipt of social assistance benefit (‘SA’), and in comparing these 
dynamics across countries. To address this topic, there are a number of definitional issues that 
need to be resolved, and there are a number of different multivariate statistical modelling 
approaches that may be employed to summarize the relationship between social assistance 
receipt and the characteristics of recipients. There are also important data issues. This paper is 
a form of ‘demonstration study’. It not only models the dynamics of social assistance benefit 
receipt in Britain using data from the British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–15, but also 
includes extensive discussion of definitional, data, and modelling issues that are relevant for 
other studies of SA receipt dynamics in different countries.  
For Britain, we find that the risk of receiving SA in one year is noticeably higher if 
SA  was  also  received  in  the  previous  year,  even  after  controlling  for  observed  and 
unobserved differences in characteristics. This might be interpreted as a state dependence or 
scarring effect of SA receipt, but such an interpretation requires caution particularly because 
it suggests that there is a single effect for all individuals. By contrast, we show for example 
that SA persistence rates are higher for lone parents than for other groups.  
Compared to previous studies, we  give much attention to trends over time in SA 
transition rates. We show that there was a clear decline in Britain over the last 15 years in the 
average SA annual entry rate (from above 4% to below 2%), and there was also a rise in the 
average SA annual persistence rate from around 60% to nearly 75%. According to the model 
estimates, the key distinction was between the period before 1998 and the period thereafter, 
which  is  somewhat  of  a  puzzle  since  the  timing  does  not  closely  correspond  with  the 
introduction of one of New Labour’s major policy reforms to the social security system. We 
also point out how changes in the characteristics of the populations at risk of entering and of 
remaining in SA receipt affected the overall SA entry and persistence rates. Factors such as 
the secular rise in educational qualifications and the decline in local unemployment rates 
would have reduced the entry rate. The growing concentration of individuals living in social 
housing among SA recipients was associated with the declining SA exit rates. 
Among definitional issues, we consider the definition of SA itself and its component 
income  sources,  the  unit  of  SA  receipt,  and  the  reference  period  over  which  receipt  is 
measured. We stress that the choices that are feasible in the context of empirical analysis will 
depend on the specific country considered and on the data sources available. We compare 
panel  data  derived  from  household  panel  surveys  with  data  derived  from  administrative 
records. A related point is that the key points of analytical interest concerning SA receipt 
dynamics  may  differ  across  countries.  For  example,  with  our  long  run  of  panel  data  we 
focused on trends over time in Britain in transition probabilities, but note that issues such as 
differences between non-immigrant citizens and immigrants – which may be of great interest 
– could not be addressed using our data source. 
With  respect  to  methods,  we  compare  the  relative  merits  of  several  multivariate 
regression modelling approaches. We use ‘dynamic random effects probit’ models in our 
application, and contribute to a growing econometric literature on the properties of different 
estimators  for  such  models.  We  also  emphasize  caution  in  interpretation  of  our  findings. 
These are largely descriptive and point to associations that are indicative but not conclusive 
regarding  causation.  A  full-blown  analysis  of  the  impact  of  particular  policies  or  policy 
changes requires a different type of study than this one. We also point to potential extensions 
to the modelling approach, for example to incorporate feedback effects: some factors may not 
only affect SA receipt chances, but also be affected by them.   
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Abstract 
 
We model the dynamics of social assistance benefit receipt in Britain using data from the 
British  Household  Panel  Survey,  waves  1–15.  First,  we  discuss  definitions  of  social 
assistance benefit receipt, and present information about the trends between 1991 and 2005 in 
the receipt of social assistance benefits, and in annual rates of transition into and out of 
receipt.  Second,  we  review  potential  multivariate  modelling  approaches  especially  the 
dynamic random effects probit models that are used in our empirical analysis and, third, 
discuss sample selection criteria and explanatory variables. Fourth, we present our regression 
estimation  estimates  and  interpret  them.  The  final  section  contains  a  summary  of  the 
substantive results, and highlights some lessons concerning application of the analysis for 
other countries and some methodological issues. 
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Introduction and background 
 
The Social Policy Division of the OECD has commissioned us “[t]o prepare a paper on the 
Dynamics of Receipt of Social Assistance Benefits in the United Kingdom. The analysis is to 
be based on panel data for the UK. One purpose of the paper is to serve as a basis for similar, 
but independent, studies for other countries. It is expected that this objective will be taken 
into account in setting out the modelling approach and discussing conceptual and data-related 
issues.” 
 
In Section 1, we discuss the definition of ‘receipt of social assistance benefits’, and explain 
what is possible to measure using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In Section 2, 
we report trends between 1991 and 2005 in the receipt of social assistance benefits in Britain, 
and in annual rates of transition into and out of receipt. We provide an outline of potential 
approaches to the multivariate modelling of the dynamics of receipt in Section 3, focusing on 
the dynamic binary random effects probit models that have been employed in similar analysis 
for Sweden and for Canada. Sample selection criteria and explanatory variables are discussed 
in Section 4. We also summarize trends in explanatory variables over the period. In Section 5, 
we present the estimates of a series of multivariate regression models, and interpret them in 
relation to the evidence about trends. We summarize the implications of the estimates in 
terms of a series of the transition probabilities and expected spell lengths for for individuals 
with different sets of characteristics. Section 6 contains a summary of the substantive results 
and  highlights  some  lessons  for  applications  of  the  analysis  to  other  countries  and  some 
methodological issues. Appendix A provides details about the software used and alternatives 
considered. Appendix B contains additional estimation results, supplementing those reported 
in the main text. 
 
The focus throughout is on individuals of working age. More specifically, we consider only 
individuals below the age of 60. (The state retirement pension age in Britain is 60 for woman 
and 65 for men.) To avoid complications associated with education and training we also 
exclude individuals aged less than 25, or individuals in benefit units in which there are any 
adults of working age who are full-time students.  
 
 
1. The definition of ‘social assistance benefit receipt’ 
 
Any empirical analysis of the dynamics of social assistance receipt requires definitions for 
three components: 
·  The benefit-receiving unit 
·  The income sources included in ‘social assistance benefits’ 
·  The time period over which the benefit(s) are received. 
We discuss these in turn. 
 
 
The benefit-receiving unit 
 
In Britain, the assessment of eligibility for benefits is based on the income of the ‘benefit 
unit’. This unit is essentially the nuclear family, referring to a single person or a couple living 
together with or without dependent children. A dependent child is aged less than 16 years, or 
more than 16 years but under 19 years and unmarried, in full-time non-advanced education 
and living with his/her parents. For brevity, we shall simply refer to children rather than   2 
dependent children. The benefit unit differs from the ‘household’. A household may contain 
several benefit units. Examples of this are a non-dependent child living with his parents (two 
benefit units), or three single adults sharing a house (three benefit units). Among persons of 
working age, there are four main ‘client groups’ of benefit units: couples with one or more 
children,  couples  without  children,  single  adults  with  one  or  more  children  (lone  parent 
families), and single adults. 
 
Although only one individual within a benefit unit is the benefit claimant, the family-based 
means test means that all the individuals within a benefit unit are assumed by the benefit 
system  to  gain  from  the  income  provided  by  a  social  security  benefit.  That  is,  there  are 
multiple recipients within each benefit unit (other than within single adult benefit units).  
 
Benefit units cannot be followed over time in any consistent manner. Benefit units change 
composition over time as individuals arrive (e.g. via birth of a child or marriage) or depart 
(e.g. via a child becoming non-dependent or leaving home, death or divorce). And these types 
of change are common (see e.g. Jenkins 2000). Thus one can only follow individuals over 
time,  though  of  course  one  can  characterise  individuals  in  terms  of  their  benefit  unit’s 
characteristics including receipt status at a given point in time. 
 
There  are,  however,  practical  issues  for  empirical  analysis  concerning  the  tracking  of 
recipient and non-recipient individuals over time. When modelling the dynamics of receipt of 
social assistance, should each benefit unit at a particular point in time be represented in the 
data set by one individual (and, if so, which one), or should there be as many observations as 
there are members of the benefit unit?  
 
On  the  one  hand,  if  one  is  interested  in  modelling  persistence  in  receipt  to  learn  about 
changes in the number of claimants over time, this suggests that one should focus on one 
individual per benefit unit, viz the claimant, in so far as he or she can be identified from the 
survey data, or another key individual such as the head of benefit unit (defined below). On 
the  other  hand,  if  one  is  interested  in  modelling  persistence  in  receipt  from  a  recipient 
perspective, this suggests that every member of a benefit unit should be represented in the 
data. The choice is complicated by the fact that a person may become a claimant or stop 
being a claimant separately from whether or not the person’s benefit unit is in receipt. For 
example, consider a lone mother who is a benefit claimant (and in receipt) in year t. At t+1, 
she repartners with a man and it is he who is now the benefit claimant (and benefit unit head). 
He was also the head of a (separate) benefit unit in year t, though his benefit unit was not in 
receipt. The woman’s receipt status has not changed, but her claimant status has. The man’s 
receipt status has changed, but he has remained a benefit unit head and potential claimant. In 
the example described, a longitudinal data set should track both the woman and the man over 
time, and count her as remaining in receipt and him as moving into receipt. More generally, 
we believe that is the changes in receipt status rather than claimant status that are more 
relevant to analysis of benefit dynamics. 
 
In sum, we track working-age adult individuals over time, and characterize each individual’s 
receipt status at each point in time in terms of whether anyone in their benefit unit was 
receiving social assistance benefits at that time. We do not track dependent children over time 
as well on the grounds that they are dependent – their benefit receipt status at a particular 
time depends entirely on their parents. ‘Children’ are included in the analysis if and when 
they become non-dependent, i.e. adults in their right. In order to focus on receipt by persons 
of working age, we did not consider benefit units in which the respondent or spouse if present   3 
was aged more than 60 years or less than 25 years. We also excluded all individuals in benefit 
units in which any adult was a full-time student. 
 
Our choice means that we have repeated observations from the same benefit unit at each 
interview,  so  introducing  a  lack  of  independence  between  observations.  This  means  that 
parameter estimates in multivariate models may be subject to bias. Essentially the amount of 
information  provided  by  the  data  is  not  as  large  as  the  nominal  sample  size  suggests. 
However, it is unclear what the magnitude of the bias is likely to be. A similar issue arises in 
the modelling of individual unemployment dynamics where the estimation sample includes 
both men and women, though we have not seen the issue explicitly discussed.
1 E.g. Stewart 
(2007) modelled men’s and women’s unemployment dynamics using BHPS data, and some 
of the men and women in his sample lived together in a marital partnership. Like Stewart, we 
ignore this complication. 
 
Following adults over time is the most commonly-used practice in the literature to date,
2 but 
there are subtle differences in practice between studies in terms of which adults are followed 
and in the definition of benefit receipt. Andrén (2007) analyzed social assistance dynamics 
using the Swedish Income Panel, a register-based panel data set based on a random sample of 
the Swedish working age population in 1990. He tracked individuals aged 18–50 years over 
time.  Because  the  sample  is  of  individuals  rather  than  households,  his  data  set  does  not 
include  all  the  individuals  from  a  given  household  in  each  year.  So,  although  there  is  a 
household means-test for social assistance benefits in Sweden, the nature of the data means 
that Andrén defines receipt in terms of whether the sample person received social assistance 
at least once during a calendar year (i.e. not whether any person in the individual’s household 
was in receipt). Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang (2006) used the Canadian Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics (SLID), a rotating panel to compare social assistance benefit dynamics 
across Canadian provinces. They state that each household is represented by one person at 
each point in time: ‘the person selected by Statistics Canada as the response person’ (p. 8), 
and a ‘household is defined as a welfare participating household, in any given year, if any 
person belonging to the household received any social assistance at any time during that year’ 
(p. 8). However, throughout their paper they refer to tracking households over time (note the 
model specification in their Section 5), and it is unclear how they treat the issue of household 
demographic change and potential changes in who is counted as a household response person 
(see the earlier discussion). Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) compared social assistance receipt 
dynamics  for  Swedish  natives  and  immigrants  using  the  Longitudinal  Individual  Data,  a 
register-based  data  set  consisting  of  a  large  panel  of  individuals,  and  their  household 
members, which is representative of the Swedish population from 1960 to 2001. Analysis is 
of men and women between the ages of 18 and 65, excluding students and retired individuals, 
tracked between 1991 and 2001. However, it appears that benefit receipt is defined on an 
individual basis rather than household basis: ‘a person as a welfare/UI recipient in a given 
year if he or she received welfare for at least a month and/or received more than one-half of 
the  so-called  “basic  amount”  …  in  unemployment  benefits  during  the  year  (2006,  p.  9). 
Enberg, Gottschalk and Wolf, (1990) use administrative data from Wisconsin on receipt of 
Aid for Families with Dependent Children. (See also Boskin and Nold (1975).) Individual 
adults are followed over time. Receipt is defined on an individual rather than household basis, 
                                                 
1 The issue does not arise in the administrative record data sets for which only one individual is sampled per 
household. 
2 One exception is our previous research on poverty dynamics (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004) also based on 
analysis of the BHPS. We tracked all individuals (adults and children) over time. Another exception is Biewen’s  
(2004) study of poverty dynamics, in which the fortunes of men aged between 18 and 65 years were tracked.   4 
but this is appropriate because the benefit-recipient unit for AFDC was the individual (the 
programme targeted lone parents).  
 
 
The income sources included in ‘social assistance benefits’ 
 
Social  assistance  benefits  are  cash  benefits  paid  to  bring  incomes  up  to  some  minimum 
income level – they refer to income maintenance. By contrast, social insurance benefits refer 
to income replacement. They are payments made in response to the occurrence of particular 
risky events such as sickness or unemployment and for which an appropriate record of social 
insurance contributions exists. (See e.g. the OECD Glossary of statistical terms used in the 
National Accounts at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2478.)  
 
According to these definitions, the principal social assistance benefits in Britain for people of 
working age are those shown in Table 1. For an overview of the British system of social 
security  benefits  and  tax  credits,  see  e.g. 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/B
eginnersGuideToBenefits/DG_10021385. 
 
Income Support (IS) and income-based Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) differ from Housing 
Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit (CTB) because receipt depends on employment status. 
Put differently, receipt of HB and CTB depends on income (and some other conditions), but 
not on employment or job-search status.  
 
 
Table 1 
The principal social assistance benefits in the UK today 
Benefit  Eligibility conditions (main) 
Income Support  Income less than a specified minimum level, and unavailable 
for full-time work (e.g. lone parent, registered sick or disabled, 
caring for someone who’s sick or elderly) 
Job Seekers Allowance 
(income based) 
Income less than a specified minimum level, and unemployed 
but able to work and available to work 
Housing Benefit   Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s housing costs 
Council Tax Benefit  Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s Council Tax bill 
Notes: Income Support was introduced in 1988 (its predecessor was called Supplementary Benefit). Housing 
Benefit was introduced in 1983 and Council Tax Benefit in 1993. Job Seekers Allowance was introduced in 
1996. See the main text for further discussion. 
 
 
Arguably, according to the definitions above, in-work benefits (notably Working Tax Credit 
at present) might also be counted as providing social assistance benefits because no national 
insurance  contribution  record  is  required  for  receipt  and  one  of  the  principal  eligibility 
conditions relates to having an income below a specified minimum level.
3 (The other main 
                                                 
3 The UK has had means-tested in-work benefit programmes for low-income working families with children 
since  1971,  when  Family  Income  Supplement  (FIS)  was  introduced.  There  have  been  major  increases  in 
generosity and changes to eligibility conditions since then that have led to substantial expansion of receipt. In 
particular, FIS became Family Credit (FC) in 1988. FC was replaced by Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC)   5 
requirement is to have a family member in full-time work – at least 16 hours per week.) 
Against this argument for counting tax credits as social assistance is that one of the key ideas 
underlying the substantial extension of tax credits by the Labour government since 1998 is 
that tax credits are not ‘welfare benefits’ – they are a key plank in Labour’s ‘welfare to work’ 
programme (note the wording). Reflecting this, tax credits are administered by HM Revenue 
and  Customs,  the  government  department  that  administers  income  taxation  and  national 
insurance  contributions,  rather  than  by  the  Department  for  Work  and  Pensions  (which 
administers IS and JSA).
4 
 
Thus, the current UK government places greater weight on the distinction between benefits 
available to families with one or more individuals in paid work and benefits available to 
families  without  individuals  in  paid  work,  than  on  the  classic  distinction  between  social 
assistance and social insurance benefits.
5 If one follows this line of thought, then, arguably, 
HB  and  CTB  should  be  treated  differently  from  IS  and  income-based  JSA,  because 
employment status is not used to assess eligibility.  
 
This is not a decisive argument however. There are merits to retaining a definition of social 
assistance benefits that accords with the classic definition, if only because this may facilitate 
cross-national comparability of analysis – we note that one of the purposes of our paper is to 
serve as a basis for similar studies for other countries. (Britain’s emphasis on ‘welfare to 
work’ is similar to that of the USA, but not to that of most European countries.) For example, 
although  other  countries  besides  Britain  may  not  provide  a  separate  system  of  housing 
benefits to help low income people with their housing costs, the levels of social assistance 
benefits may be set in a fashion that is intended to cover such costs. 
 
As it happens, the recipient populations receiving IS and JSA on the one hand, and HB and 
CTB on the other hand, overlap substantially, and so the choice of whether to include housing 
benefits in the definition of social assistance benefits may be of little practical importance.
6 
 
There is an additional complication concerning the treatment of JSA and its predecessors. 
Before  1996,  individuals  with  a  satisfactory  national  insurance  contribution  record  were 
eligible to claim Unemployment Benefit (UB) when they became unemployed, and the level 
of benefit paid was a flat-rate that was not means-tested. Unemployed individuals with an 
incomplete national insurance contribution record and a sufficiently low income were eligible 
to claim IS (on a means-tested basis). UB recipients were also eligible to claim an IS top-up if 
their total family income including UB was below the IS minimum. (This was more likely, 
the  greater  the  number  of  dependents.)  Because  UB  payments  were  relatively  low,  most 
recipients were also eligible for  IS. JSA was introduced from October 1996 as a unified 
benefit  for  unemployed  jobseekers.  Contribution-based  JSA  is  the  successor  to  UB  and 
receipt  requires  a  satisfactory  national  insurance  contributions  record.  Income-based  JSA 
                                                                                                                                                        
in October 1999 and fully phased in by April 2000. WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit (WTC) and 
Child Tax Credit programmes from April 2003. WTC extended eligibility to single people and to families 
without children. See Brewer and Shephard (2004) for a concise overview of the Labour government’s welfare 
to work policies and associated changes in the social security benefit system. 
4 Eligibility for Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit is assessed by local authorities. 
5 There are also benefits for individuals who are ill or injured not discussed here (see the URL cited earlier): 
Statutory Sick Pay for employees, Incapacity Benefit for those unable to work because of illness or disability 
and with a suitable national insurance contributions record, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit for those ill 
or disabled because of an accident or event that happened at work or in connection with work. 
6 In our estimation sample, 65% of the recipients of social assistance (defined as including IS or UB/JSA) are 
also receiving HB or CTB. Of those receiving HB or CTB, 61% also received social assistance benefits.   6 
rather  than  IS  is  now  the  means-tested  benefit  that  is  paid  to  low-income  unemployed 
workers with insufficient national insurance contributions. It remains the case that most JSA 
recipients  receive  some  income-based  benefits.  For  example,  according  to  administrative 
record data, at 1 August 2004, there were 737,000 JSA recipients in total, of whom 18% 
(136,000) received only contribution-based JSA and 82% (601,000) received income-based 
JSA, including 12,000 with underlying entitlement to contribution-based benefit.
7 
 
In practice, it is difficult to reliably distinguish between receipt of contribution-based JSA 
and  income-based  JSA.  Since  JSA’s  introduction,  the  BHPS  interview  has  not  asked 
respondents receiving JSA to distinguish between the two types for precisely this reason 
(Heather  Laurie,  BHPS  Survey  Manager,  personal  communication).  Prior  to  JSA’s 
introduction,  respondents  were  asked  to  say  whether  they  were  receiving  UB  or  UB 
combined with IS, though it is unclear how accurately respondents were able to distinguish 
them. 
 
Hence, to produce a consistent longitudinal series for individuals’ social assistance benefit 
receipt from the BHPS, one must combine receipt of UB and UB/IS prior to 1996, and receipt 
of both types of JSA with receipt of IS after 1996. One cannot define social assistance in 
terms of IS alone, i.e. excluding receipt of any type of unemployment benefits, because the 
shift of unemployed jobseekers from IS to JSA in 1996 was largely administrative. And, 
whereas one might wish to include only unemployment benefits with a means-tested element 
in the definition of social assistance benefit, this is not feasible. The only way to distinguish 
the two types of JSA receipt after 1996 would be to estimate national insurance contribution 
records, and whether they were satisfactory, using the BHPS between-wave work monthly 
history data about employment spells and the interview data about earnings. Our view is that 
such estimates would be time-consuming and subject to error. In any case, the payoff from 
doing so is relatively small. As stated earlier, the vast majority of JSA recipients receive 
income-based JSA, just as a substantial fraction of UB recipients also received an IS top-up. 
We note that Hansen and Lofstrom’s (2006) analysis of the dynamics of social assistance 
receipt in Sweden also included receipt of some unemployment benefits in the definition of 
social assistance. We also observe that the DWP’s Statistical Summary of social security 
benefits has not broken down JSA recipient numbers by type of JSA since 2005. 
 
 
The time period of receipt 
 
Individuals receive benefits over periods of time. Spells may start or end on any day of the 
week, though for spells in progress, payments are made fortnightly. In any given calendar 
year, an individual may have no receipt, a single spell of receipt, or multiple spells of receipt, 
and any of these spells may overlap calendar  years. Hence the ‘dynamics’ of receipt are 
potentially very complicated. Empirical work to date has taken a simpler approach. 
 
Previous analysis of social assistance receipt dynamics has mostly defined the time period of 
receipt  in  terms  of  ‘a  social  assistance  year’.  For  example,  in  Andrén’s  (2007)  analysis, 
receipt  in  a  given  calendar  year  is  based  on  whether  the  sample  person  received  social 
assistance at least once during that  year. (His data set provides no information about the 
sequence of social assistance received during the year, only the number of months.) Hansen 
and Lofstrom (2006) applied a similar definition to a different Swedish administrative data 
                                                 
7 See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/stats_summary/Stats_Summary_dec2004_final.pdf.    7 
source: see the quotation from their paper above. And Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang’s (2006) 
definition of receipt of Canada’s Social Assistance benefit in a given year refers to receipt at 
any time during that year. In all three cases, it is apparently straightforward to characterise 
the ‘year’ over which receipt may occur. This is largely because of the nature of the data 
sources: the two Swedish studies are based on administrative record data and the SLID, used 
by Hansen and Lofstrom (2006), also utilizes administrative record linkage as the source for 
income for many respondents. 
 
Interview-based surveys like the BHPS collect benefit receipt information differently, as a 
consequence  of  wishing  to  minimize  measurement  error  and  respondent  burden.  At  each 
BHPS interview, in the Autumn of each year, a lot of information is collected about the 
various income sources received at the time of the interview, and the corresponding amounts. 
Information  about  receipt  of  each  source  is  also  collected  for  each  month  back  to  the 
September of the year prior to the current survey year using the respondent’s retrospective 
recall.
8 Since the between-interview interval is not always 12 months, defining the income 
reference  year  in  this  manner  ensures  that  all  respondents  are  asked  about  all  calendar 
months. But, at the same time, it also means that the retrospective benefit histories from 
successive interviews provide two reports for each of the months for which the reference 
years overlap.  
 
To create a consistent history of receipt of each individual, and hence to define receipt over 
succession of ‘social assistance years’ (as in the studies cited earlier), one has to decide how 
to handle inconsistencies in reports that arise for the overlap months. It is well known that 
such retrospective histories often show an implausible number of transitions at the ‘seam’ 
where successive histories are spliced together. There is an additional complication because, 
as we have explained, social assistance receipt should be defined in terms of whether any 
individual in a person’s benefit unit is in receipt. To do this for each ‘social assistance year’ 
requires information about receipt for every individual who was present in the respondent’s 
benefit unit within each month of the relevant year. However, for adults who left the benefit 
unit after the last interview and before the current interview, there is no history of receipt 
over  the  reference  period  prior  to  the  current  interview.  (By  definition,  they  are  not 
interviewed.) Receipt over the  year defined in terms of receipt by any  person within the 
individual’s benefit unit may therefore be under-reported. Addressing these issues in order to 
develop  a  ‘social  assistance  year’  measure  may  well  be  possible,  but  would  be  time-
consuming. It is beyond the scope of the current project. 
 
Our proposal for this project is to define focus on receipt at the time of the annual interview, 
so that the dynamics of receipt refers to transitions on and off benefit between successive 
interviews. This not only avoids the problems of building a consistent ‘social assistance year’ 
definition but also exploits the benefit data that are measured most reliably (at the time of the 
interview). We would also point out that the definition is consistent with many studies of the 
probability of unemployment, and transitions into and out of unemployment, based on panel 
surveys: see e.g. Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). 
 
 
                                                 
8 The sequence of questions used in the BHPS retrospective histories is: (i) did you receive source X at any time 
over the reference period; (ii) if yes, was it received in every month; (iii) if no, in which months?   8 
Summary 
 
The definition of social assistance benefit receipt is not straightforward. The choice depends 
on country-specific factors – the structure of the social security benefit system and how it has 
changed over time – and on the data sources available. What is possible with household panel 
surveys differs from what is possible with data sets built from benefit administration records. 
 
We track working age adults over time using BHPS data from survey years 1991 to 2005, 
using  respondents  to  the  original  (‘Essex’)  sample  only.
9  An  individual  defined  to  be  in 
receipt if any individual in his or her benefit unit is receiving social assistance benefits at the 
time of the BHPS interview. We define ‘social assistance benefits’ as including IS and either 
UB or JSA (of either type).  
 
 
2. Trends in receipt probabilities and annual transition probabilities 
 
In this section, we provide information about trends in receipt of social assistance and other 
related benefits from a cross-sectional perspective and then about trends in transition rates 
into and out of receipt. This sets the scene for the multivariate analysis to follow. We use the 
sample  of  working-age  adults  defined  earlier  (and  described  in  more  detail  later  on). 
Although the main focus of the paper is on social assistance benefit receipt and its trends, it is 
useful to place these in context with some comparisons with other benefits. For convenience, 
the following abbreviations and acronyms are used: 
·  SA: ‘social assistance’,  meaning  receipt of  IS,  with or without receipt of UB or JSA 
(depending on survey year), or UB/JSA without IS receipt. 
·  HA: housing benefits, meaning receipt of HB or CTB 
·  SAHA: social assistance including housing benefits, meaning receipt of SA or HA (or 
both) 
·  TC: employment-conditional tax credits of any kind, meaning receipt of Family Credit, 
Working Families Tax Credit or Working Tax Credit (depending on survey year). 
Because  HA  may  received  by  those  receiving  employment-conditional  tax  credits,  the 
memberships of the SAHA and TC recipient groups may overlap. 
 
All  cross-sectional  statistics  were  computed  using  the  BHPS  cross-section  respondent 
weights. Longitudinal statistics such as transition probabilities were computed unweighted, as 
it is unclear in several cases what the appropriate weight would be (particular when we pool 
transitions from multiple waves) and, in any case, the BHPS longitudinal weights that are 
available at wave s for any wave s = 1–15, exist only for original sample respondents who 
were interviewed at wave 1 and every wave up to and including wave s.  
 
Breakdowns are also provided for the four principal client groups defined earlier: couples 
without children, couples with children, lone parents and singles. In the full person-wave 
sample, individuals belonging to tax units of couples with children were the most numerous 
group  (41%  of  the  sample).  The  next  largest  group  of  individuals  belonged  to  childless 
couples (35%). Single childless tax units formed 19% of the sample, and lone parents 5% of 
the  sample.  The  relatively  small  number  of  lone  parents  in  the  sample  means  that  all 
                                                 
9 Thus, observations from the extension samples incorporated at the end of the 1990s for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland will not be used. Taking account of the differential sample inclusion probabilities would be a 
large task, beyond the scope of this project, and the number of observations in the original 1991 sample is 
relatively large in any case (see below).   9 
estimates  of  rates  shown  below  should  be  treated  with  caution,  especially  the  annual 
transition rates (for which the numbers involved are between 80 and 100). 
 
 
Trends in rates of receipt of benefits 
 
Cross-sectional trends in receipt are summarised in Figures 1–5. Apart from the rise in receipt 
at the beginning of the 1990s, when Britain was in recession, the percentage of all adults in 
receipt of SA fell gradually from a peak of around 12% in 1993 to a low of around 6% in 
2005. The proportion in receipt of SAHA was consistently 2%–3% higher than the proportion 
in receipt of SA, but followed a similar downward trend. The proportion of all adults in 
receipt of tax credits was consistently about 2% to 3% during the 1990s, until the introduction 
of WFTC in October 1999, after which the proportion in receipt rose dramatically to about 
6.6% in 2002. The proportion then rose again significantly with the extension of eligibility 
provided by the change to WTC in 2003. 
 
Figure 1. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: all adults  
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Among couples without children (Figure 2), SA receipt rates stayed relatively low, at around 
5%, with little trend. TC receipt rates were zero until eligibility was extended to the group 
with the introduction of WTC. Among couples with children (Figure 3), the SA receipt rate 
halved in 15 years from around 10% in 1992 and 1993 to just below 5% in 2005. TC receipt 
rates were about 5% during the mid-1990s but doubled at the end of the decade after the 
introduction of WFTC when there was a dramatic increase in receipt (11% were in receipt by 
2001), and there was another increase in 2003 when WTC was introduced (to over 20%). 
 
Lone parents have the highest SA receipt rates among the four client groups, but the rates for 
this group have also trended downward since the early 1990s (Figure 4). Almost 55% of lone 
parents were in SA receipt 1992–1994 but, in 2005, the rate was ‘only’ 25%. The difference 
between the rate of SA receipt and rate of SAHA receipt is also greater than for other groups   10 
(typically more than 10%) and appears to have widened slightly between the beginning and 
end of the period. Lone parents were one of the principal target groups for the welfare-to-
work changes in in-work benefits introduced at the end of the 1990s, and hence the sharp 
increase in TC receipt at that time. At the start of the 1990s, the proportion of lone parents 
receiving TC was around 10%; it was 35% by 2001, and reached 45% in 2005. 
 
Among single adults, the proportion receiving SA declined sharply from around 15% in 1992 
to about 8% in 2005. The proportion receiving SAHA is markedly higher, and the trend 
downward in receipt was more gradual, from around 20% in 1992 to around 17% in 2005. 
The TC receipt rate only became non-zero in 2003 with the introduction of WTC, which 
extended eligibility to this group. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: couples without children 
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Figure 3. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: couples with children 
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Figure 4. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: lone parents 
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Figure 5. Trends in receipt of SA, SAHA, and TC: single adults  
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Trends in annual rates of entry to and exit from social assistance benefit receipt 
 
Figures 6–10 show trends in annual transition rates into and out of receipt. The exit rate is the 
number of individuals in receipt at survey year t–1 who are no longer in receipt at t, divided 
by the total number in receipt at t–1, and expressed as a percentage. (The persistence rate is 
one minus the exit rate.) Similarly, the entry rate is the number of individuals not in receipt at 
survey year t–1 who are in receipt at t, divided by the total number of individuals not in 
receipt at t–1, expressed as a percentage. The denominator of the entry rate calculation is 
much larger than the denominator of the exit rate calculation, with the exception of lone 
parents  for  whom  they  are  of  much  the  same  order.  Annual  transition  rates  have  been 
calculated even though small cell sizes mean that estimates are subject to relatively large 
sampling variability in some cases. Trends remain relatively clear despite this, however.  
 
Breakdowns by client group refer to client group membership at  year t. (Breakdowns by 
group membership at t–1 led to very similar pictures.)  
 
Each  of  the  figures  that  follows  shows  trends  in  annual  entry  and  exit  rates  for  SA.  A 
downward trend in the cross-sectional rate of receipt of social assistance – as demonstrated 
earlier for most groups – may reflect an upward trend in the exit rate (decline in the retention 
rate) or a downward trend in entry rates. We show that it is the latter which appears to be the 
main influence. 
 
Taking all adults together (Figure 6) shows that the decline in cross-sectional receipt rates 
reflects a downward trend in entry rates: the fall in the entry rate is sufficiently large that it 
offsets the decline in the exit rate over the same period. However the decline in the entry rate 
stopped  in  around  2000,  and  the  rate  is  relatively  constant  thereafter.  Illustrating  these   13 
changes, note that the SA annual exit rate is 37% if transitions from the first nine waves are 
pooled  (t–1  corresponding  to  waves  1–9),  and  29%  for  transitions  pooled  from  years 
thereafter. The corresponding entry rates are 3.2% and 1.6%. For the period as a whole, the 
exit rate is 34% and the entry rate 2.4%. 
 
For childless couples (Figure 7), and couples with children (Figure 8), much the same story 
can be told. The decline in the cross-sectional rate of receipt arises from a declining entry 
rates offsetting declining exit rates, and the trends levelled off from around 2000. (Note the 
relatively large fluctuations in the exit rate for childless couples, related to small sample 
numbers.) 
 
For lone parents (Figure 9), there is marked sampling variability in both the annual entry and 
annual exit rates but, notwithstanding this, it is interesting that SA exit rates appear to rise 
slightly over time, i.e. in the opposite direction to adults in couple benefit units. The SA entry 
rate appears to decline  over the period as a whole, and its impact on the cross-sectional 
proportion in receipt is reinforced by rising exit rate. For single adults, exit rates were fairly 
constant between 1991 and 2005, whereas the entry rate declined over time but the rate of 
decline was slower in the 2000s than in the 1990s. 
 
The pattern of trends in SA entry and exit transition probabilities raises interesting questions 
about what determined them. The change in the entry rate at the end of the 1990s might 
suggest that the reforms of the benefit system and other New Labour policies introduced at 
around that time might have been responsible. However there is no sharp correspondence 
between the dates of the introduction of major reforms like WFTC in 1999 and changes in 
transition probabilities. Also, changes occurred for childless couples and for single adults as 
well as for families with children, and it was low income families with children who were the 
principal targets of the policies. In part, the lack of clear cut correspondences between trends 
in transition rates and the timing of reforms may simply reflect the combination of a number 
of reforms with different impacts on different groups. (We offer further cautionary words 
about the identification of causal explanations below.) 
 
That  said,  one  might  expect  the  introduction  of  WFTC  to  reduce  SA  entry  rates  on  the 
grounds that, if successful, people who lose their job would be less likely to take up SA 
benefits because the income from getting a new job was now boosted by WFTC. On similar 
grounds, one might expect the introduction of WFTC to raise exit rates from SA because 
WFTC made work more attractive compared to not working. An argument to the contrary is 
that the changing entry rates also lead to changes in the composition of the SA recipient 
population. Thus there may be a decline in the exit rate, reflecting a type of ‘creaming off’. 
I.e. it may be that as the fraction of the population receiving SA declined, the people who did 
receive SA were more likely to have characteristics associated with lower exit rates, other 
things equal. Indeed we observe the SA exit rate declining for all client groups apart from 
lone parents, for whom it rose. Petrongolo (2007) discusses the impact of the introduction of 
JSA  in  October  1996,  including  the  more  stringent  job  search  conditions  imposed  on 
claimants relative to the previous system. She suggests that the reforms increased the number 
of non-employed people who were not claiming benefits but did not clearly increase the job-
finding rate. (Some may have moved to other benefits such as incapacity benefits rather than 
SA.) In Figure 6, an association between the timing of JSA introduction and SA entry rates is 
hard to discern, however. 
   14 
Figure 6. Annual transition rates: SA, all adults 
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Figure 7. Annual transition rates: SA, couples without children 
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Figure 8. Annual transition rates: SA, couples with children 
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Figure 9. Annual transition rates: SA, lone parents 
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Figure 10. Annual transition rates: SA, single adults 
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3. Multivariate modelling approaches  
 
There are two main approaches to modelling benefit dynamics using multivariate methods: 
hazard or duration models using data about spell lengths, or models of annual probabilities of 
entry to and exit from receipt (‘transition probability’ models). As explained earlier, it is not 
feasible within the scope of the current project to derive satisfactory data about spell lengths 
of  social  assistance  benefit  receipt.  We  therefore  focus  on  models  of  annual  transition 
probabilities. 
 
A model of whether someone is receiving social assistance benefit at a point in time is an 
example of a model with a binary dependent variable. Three main types of models have been 
used  in  related  contexts  to  examine  dynamics  in  general  and  transition  probabilities  in 
particular: 
·  Basic models with no allowance for unobserved heterogeneity or state dependence;  
·  Endogenous switching models with unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence; and 
·  Lagged dependent variable models with unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence 
(‘dynamic random effects probit models’). 
We discuss the models in turn.  
 
Each of three model types makes particular assumptions about the nature of the dynamic 
process,  and  specific  distributional  assumptions.  Another  way  of  incorporating  greater 
flexibility and minimizing distributional assumptions is to use linear probability models of 
receipt dynamics, estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments estimators proposed 
by  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  and  others.  See  Stewart  (2007)  for  an  application  to  the 
dynamics of individuals’ unemployment status. Because we wish to focus on the types of 
models most commonly applied to social assistance dynamics in the past, and because of the 
limited resources available for the current project, we do not discuss linear probability models 
of dynamics further.  
 
 
Basic transition rate models 
 
The pioneering application of the basic transition rate models to benefit dynamics was by 
Boskin and Nold (1975). For an application of their methods to benefit dynamics among 
British lone mothers, see Böheim, Ermisch, and Jenkins (1999). Although these models are 
no  longer  the  models  of  choice,  they  provide  a  useful  reference  point  for  the  more 
sophisticated types of model. 
 
The processes of entry to and exit from receipt are modelled separately. For those that are not 
in receipt in the base period (call it t–1), there is a model for the probability that an individual 
moves from non-receipt at time t–1 to receipt at time t (the entry probability). And for those 
that are in receipt at t–1, there is a model for the probability of moving from receipt at t–1 to 
non-receipt at t (the exit probability).  
 
Suppose the latent entry probability, r*it, is a linear function of characteristics: 
r*it  = b¢Xit  + uit   (1) 
where subscript i indexes individuals, Xit is a vector of characteristics associated with person 
i, and uit is a ‘white noise’ error term, with mean zero and uncorrelated with Xit. One can 
control for secular trends in transition probabilities by incorporating functions of calendar   18 
time among the explanatory variables in Xit. An entry to receipt is observed if r
*
it > 0 and is 
zero otherwise.  
 
The latent exit probability, q*it is specified analogously: 
q*it = a¢Zit  + vit  (2) 
where Zit is a vector of characteristics for individual i (which, again, may include functions of 
calendar time), and vit is a white noise error term, with mean zero and uncorrelated with Zit. 
The  b  and  a  are  vectors  of  parameters,  to  be  estimated,  which  capture  the  relationship 
between  characteristics  and  transition  probabilities.  Estimation  of  each  model  is 
straightforward using e.g. either a standard logit estimator (if the errors are assumed to be 
logistically  distributed)  or  a  standard  probit  estimator  (if  the  errors  are  assumed  to  be 
normally distributed). 
 
The  major  advantages  of  this  modelling  approach  are  that  it  is  easy  to  estimate  and  it 
straightforward to interpret the estimated parameters. In particular, Boskin and Nold (1975) 
derived  a  number  of  expressions  that  usefully  describe  the  process  of  benefit  dynamics. 
Suppose that the observed entry and exit rates rit and qit are at constant ‘steady state’ levels ri 
and qi (the time subscript is no longer relevant). The probability of being in SA receipt in any 
given year, equivalently the expected proportion of time in which i is in receipt of social 
assistance, is ri/(ri + qi). The mean duration of a spell of SA receipt for someone beginning a 
spell is 1/qi years, and the mean duration of a spell of SA non-receipt for someone leaving 
receipt is 1/ri years. The corresponding median spell lengths are –log(2)/log(1–qi) years and –
log(2)/log(1–ri) years. The expected turnover rate is the expected proportion of time spent in 
SA receipt multiplied by the exit rate. Equivalently it is the number of years in which there is 
a transition between receipt and non-receipt, expressed as a fraction of total time. The higher 
the  turnover  rate,  the  lower  is  the  regularity  of  receipt.  These  expressions  are  useful  for 
interpretative purposes even if transition rates are not in fact constant over time. They help 
reveal in numerical terms how the benefit dynamics process differs between individuals with 
different sets of characteristics. 
 
The basic transition probability model incorporates several important simplifications that ease 
estimation.  The  first  is  that  there  is  no  persistent  unobserved  individual  heterogeneity  in 
transition  probabilities.
10  That  is,  all  individual  differences  are  encapsulated  by  observed 
characteristics  (the  elements  of  Xit  and  Zit).  Once  observed  characteristics  have  been 
controlled for, there is no association between unobserved factors determining exit rates and 
unobserved  factors  determining  exit  rates.  According  to  (1),  the  predicted  SA  entry 
probability is simply F(b¢Xit) in the probit case and, according to (2), the predicted SA exit 
probability is simply F(a¢Zit). (F(.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution.) 
 
Second, receipt probabilities do not depend directly on past receipt. Persistence in receipt 
over time is assumed to be due to persistence in observed characteristics: the predicted SA 
persistence probability is 1–F(a¢Zit) in the probit case. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
experience  of  social  assistance  receipt  may  have  an  independent  ‘scarring  effect’  –  past 
                                                 
10  In  addition,  the  unobservable  error  terms  at  t  for  each  individual,  uit  and  vit  are  assumed  to  be  neither 
correlated with their past values or with each other. Use of cluster-robust standard errors (where the clusters 
refer to groups of observations for each individual) can help mitigate problems arising if these assumptions do 
not hold.   19 
recipients may have greater chances of being current recipients, other things being equal. 
This is the situation known as ‘state dependence’.
11  
 
Third, and related, no account is taken of ‘initial conditions’ – whether or not an individual is 
in receipt or not in the base year is treated as exogenously given. Put differently, among the 
individuals found to be in receipt in the base year one might expect an over-representation of 
individuals  with  unobserved  characteristics  associated  with  higher  chances  of  being  a 
recipient. Using this selected sample may yield biased estimates of the transition probabilities 
among the population.  
 
The two types of model discussed next address these issues in different ways. Common to 
both approaches, however, is that they model the probability of receipt at t rather than the 
probability of making a transition between times t–1and t, and the implications for transition 
probabilities are derived indirectly. 
 
 
Endogenous switching models 
 
Following  Cappellari  and  Jenkins  (2004,  2008),  suppose  that  the  latent  probability  of 
receiving social assistance in year t, p*it, is characterised by  
p*it  =  [(yit–1)g1¢  +  (1–yit–1)g2¢]Zit–1  + eit;  eit  = ti  +  zit  (3) 
where  g1  and  g2,  are  vectors  of  parameters  to  be  estimated,  Zit–1  is  a vector  of  observed 
characteristics at t–1,
12 and the composite error term eit is the sum of an individual-specific 
effect  (ti)  plus  an  orthogonal  white  noise  error  (zit).  The  ti  term  allows  for  persistent 
unobserved heterogeneity. (Because we can only follow individuals, and not benefit units 
over time, we would emphasise that the individual-specific effect is precisely that – it is not a 
benefit-unit-specific effect.) An individual is observed to be in receipt at t if p*it > 0, in which 
case yit = 1, and a non-recipient otherwise (yit = 0). Thus the impact of explanatory variables 
on current receipt status may differ (‘switch’) according to whether the individual was in 
receipt at t–1 (yit–1 = 1) or not (yit–1 = 0). 
 
There  is  a  second  equation  for  receipt  status  in  the  base  year.  This  describes  ‘initial 
conditions’ using a reduced-form approach, analogous to that proposed by Heckman (1981). 
The latent receipt propensity at t–1, p*it–1, is characterised by: 
p*it–1  =  b¢Xit–1 + uit–1; vit–1  = mi + dit–1 ;   (4) 
where Xit–1 is a vector of explanatory variables, b is a vector of parameters, and the composite 
error term vit–1 is the sum of an individual-specific effect (mi) plus an orthogonal white noise 
error (dit–1).  
 
The model specification is completed by assuming that the composite error terms eit and vit–1 
are distributed bivariate standard normal, so that the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
is parameterised by the cross-equation correlation, j (given the necessary normalisations of 
                                                 
11 The most commonly-cited explanations for state dependence refer to the labour market. For example, the 
experience of social assistance benefit receipt may change individuals’ preferences for and attitudes to paid 
work (cf. the culture of poverty hypothesis extensively discussed particularly in the USA), or employers might 
treat social assistance receipt as a adverse signal of a potential worker’s qualities. See e.g. Arulampulam, Booth, 
and Taylor (2000) and Arulampalam, Gregg, and Gregory (2001). 
12    Cappellari  and  Jenkins  (2004)  used  lagged  values  as  explanatory  variables,  but  this  is  not  essential. 
Contemporaneous values, i.e. Zt rather than Zt–1 could also be used.    20 
the variances of the composite error to equal one). This correlation is the covariance between 
the  individual-specific  error  components:  j    º  corr(vit-1,  eit)  =  cov(hi, ti).  If  j    =  0,  the 
switching term in (3), yit–1, is exogenous: initial conditions do not matter for the estimation of 
the current receipt probability. In general, however, with j  ¹ 0, initial conditions do matter: 
hence the ‘endogenous switching’ label for the model. If j = 0, then one is back to the Boskin 
Nold model of the previous subsection. 
 
Transition probabilities can be derived from the model. The exit rate from receipt is one 
minus the probability of remaining in receipt (sit), i.e. one minus the probability of being in 
receipt at t, conditional on being in receipt at t–1. The receipt entry rate, eit, is the probability 
of being in receipt at t, conditional on not being in receipt at t–1. Expressions for these 
probabilities are given, respectively, by: 
F2(g1¢Zit–1, b¢Xit–1; j) 
sit  º  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 1, Zit–1, Xit–1) =  
F(b¢Xit–1) 
(5) 
and  
F2(g2¢Zit–1, –b¢Xit–1; –j) 
eit º  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 0, Zit–1, Xit–1)  =  
F(–b¢Xit–1) 
(6) 
where F2(.) is the cumulative density functions of the bivariate standard normal distribution. 
With  expressions  for  these  probabilities,  one  can  derive  the  ‘Boskin-Nold’  expressions 
describing the process of benefit dynamics that were mentioned earlier in the context of the 
basic transition rate model (Cappellari and Jenkins 2004). 
 
State dependence refers to the extent to which the chances of receiving social assistance at t 
differ according to whether social assistance was received at t–1, while controlling for the 
effects of heterogeneity, observed and unobserved. The degree of state dependence may be 
summarised  by  calculating,  for  each  individual,  the  difference  between  the  predicted 
probability  of  receipt  conditional  on  receipt  and  the  predicted  probability  of  receipt 
conditional on being a non-recipient poor last period, and then taking the average across all 
individuals.
13 
 
The endogenous switching model addresses the three shortcomings of the basic model and, in 
principle, it may also be extended to take account of panel attrition and other endogenous 
selection processes.
14  
 
Estimation of the endogenous switching model requires, at minimum, observations on a large 
number of individuals for a pair of successive  years (t–1 and t), as for the basic model. 
Typically however sample sizes for a single pair of years are relatively small – the advantage 
of a long run of panel data is that it provides multiple pairs of base and current years. Both 
this model and the basic model use these multiple year-pairs by pooling them. This raises no 
additional issues for the basic model because of the strong assumptions incorporated in its 
specification. Pooling does raise issues for the estimation of the endogenous switching model. 
The observations in the pooled data set are not independently distributed: because the data set 
contains  repeated  observations  on  the  same  individual,  the  common  individual-specific 
unobserved  error  components  induce  cross-observation  correlations  and  thence  biased 
estimates  of  standard  errors.  Econometricians  usually  recommend  handling  this  issue  by 
estimating  the  model  in  a  manner  that  takes  account  of  this  aspect  –  what  is  known  as 
                                                 
13  The  calculation  of  individual-specific  probability  differences  (which  are  then  averaged)  ensures  that 
individual heterogeneity is controlled for. 
14 For an application, see Cappellari and Jenkins (2008).   21 
‘integrating out’ the individual-specific effect. The feasibility of applying this procedure to 
estimation of endogenous switching models declines rapidly, the greater the number of waves 
of data used, and the more processes that are modelled. In the light of this, Cappellari and 
Jenkins (2004, 2008) propose that, instead of using a model-based approach, analysts control 
for the effects of cross-observation correlations using a cluster-robust estimator.  
 
A feature of the Cappellari-Jenkins approach of pooling transitions is that the same initial 
conditions  specification  is  used  for  every  year  t–1  forming  part  of  every  year  t–1-year  t 
transition pair. The term ‘initial conditions’ is therefore perhaps a misnomer in this context, 
and arguably should be reserved for the first year of a complete sequence of observations for 
a given individual rather than the first year in each transition pair.  
 
Labels  aside,  observe  that  statistical  identification  of  the  parameters  of  the  endogenous 
switching  model  –  other  than  by  appeal  to  functional  form  –  requires  the  availability  of 
variables among the regressors (Xt–1) in the base year receipt probability equation that do not 
also explain the current year receipt probability. We discuss this general issue of finding 
‘instruments’ below. 
 
 
Lagged dependent variable models (dynamic random effects probit models) 
 
A ‘lagged dependent variable’ approach is one employed for the analysis of social assistance 
dynamics by Andrén (2007), Hansen, Lofstrom (2006), and Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang 
(2006). The approach has also been used to study the dynamics of unemployment by e.g. 
Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). Biewen (2004) also used the 
approach,  and  extensions  of  it,  to  study  poverty  dynamics.  Econometricians  refer  to  the 
model as a dynamic random effects probit model.  
 
Let  
p*it  =  g¢Zit  + lyit–1  + ti + zit;   t = 2, …, Ti  (7) 
describe the latent probability of social assistance receipt in each year of the sequence of Ti 
years for which an individual is observed in the panel, excluding the first year (t = 1). An 
individual is observed to be in receipt, yit = 1, in year t if p*it > 0 and yit = 0 otherwise.  
 
By  contrast  with  the  endogenous  switching  model,  all  the  effects  of  receipt  at  t–1  (state 
dependence) are characterised through the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (yit–1) 
– hence our label for the model. The larger (more positive) the value of l, the greater the 
degree of state dependence in benefit receipt probabilities. As with the endogenous switching 
model, unobserved individual heterogeneity is characterised by a fixed individual-specific 
component  (ti)  and  a  white  noise  error  component  (zit),  where  the  error  terms  are 
uncorrelated with each other and with the explanatory variables included in Zit. The errors are 
each assumed to have a mean of zero and be normally distributed (so it is a probit model), 
with the variance of eit normalised to be one, and variance of ti estimated from the data.
15  
                                                 
15  Although  normality  is  the  most  commonly  used  assumption  concerning  the  distribution  of  the  error 
components, some authors have considered instead discrete mass point distributions: see e.g. Hansen, Lofstrom, 
and Zhang (2006), and Stewart (2007). Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) used a random effects logit specification 
rather  than  a  random  effects  probit  one.  There  have  also  been  extensions  of  the  model  that  allow  for  an 
autocorrelated error structure for the error term zit (Andrén 2007, Stewart 2007) or unrestricted error structure 
(Andrén 2007).   22 
 
The  standard  random  effects  model  assumes  that  the  unobserved  individual-specific 
components are uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables. We follow Mundlak 
(1978) and Chamberlain (1984), and a number of authors since, in allowing for correlations 
between ui and Zit by supposing that 
ti  =  x¢ i Z  + ui   (8) 
where ui is distributed N(0, su
2) and is assumed independent of Zit and zit for all persons and 
time periods. The  i Z  may be defined in several ways – we follow the common practice of 
defining them as the longitudinal average for each individual of each characteristic within the 
vector Zit (with the exception of intrinsically time-varying variables like age).
16 Intuitively, 
differences  in  longitudinal  averaged  characteristics  are  informative  about  underlying 
individual-specific characteristics, so that the individual differences that are left (ui) may be 
more  plausibly  supposed  to  be  independent  of  observed  characteristics.  For  brevity  in 
notation, we subsume the time-averaged variables into the vector Zit henceforth. 
 
The model assumes that the correlation between the composite errors from any two years t 
and s, t ¹ s, is the same for any t, s = 2, …, Ti:  
r = corr(ui + zit, ui + zis )=  su
2 / (1 + su
2).  (9) 
 
As with the endogenous switching model, there is an issue for estimation concerning the 
‘initial  conditions’  of  the  sequence  of  observations  for  each  individual  –  whether  yi1  is 
independent of ui. If receipt in the initial year is correlated with the time-invariant individual-
specific effect, a correlation is induced between the error term and the lagged dependent 
variable in (7), leading to bias in parameter estimates.  
 
There are several approaches to handling endogenous initial conditions, of which the most 
popular  is  that  proposed  by  Heckman  (1981).  The  receipt  equation  for  the  first  year  is 
specified using a reduced-form linear approximation as  
p
*
i1 = p¢Xi1  +  vi  (10) 
where vi is assumed to be distributed as standard normal and correlated with ti but not with 
zit. Such a correlation is typically modelled as an orthogonal projection of vi on ti:  
vi  = qti + zi1.  (11) 
The presence of correlated individual specific effects in equations (7) and (8) implies that the 
initial period equation must be modelled jointly with the dynamic equation in order to obtain 
consistent maximum likelihood estimators. 
 
Estimation of the full model using the Heckman estimator is typically done by ‘integrating 
out’ the individual-specific error term from the likelihood function using quadrature methods 
or by using maximum simulated likelihood methods. We use the latter: see Appendix A for 
discussion of software issues. 
 
There  are  other  estimators  of  the  full  model  that  do  not  rely  on  such  computationally 
intensive  techniques.  Orme  (1997,  2001)  suggested  a  two-step  procedure  in  the  spirit  of 
Heckman’s  (1979)  methods  for  corrections  for  sample  selection.  Orme  noted  that  if  the 
                                                 
16  Neither  Andrén  (2007)  or  Hansen,  Lofstrom,  and  Zhang  (2006)  appear  to  have  used  the  Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach.   23 
individual-specific random effect is factorised into orthogonal components ui = dhi + wi, so 
that equation (7) becomes  
p*it   =   g¢Zit  + lyit–1  + dhi + wi  +  eit  (7¢) 
and if one can control for the presence of the hi term in the equation, then the initial condition 
issue  no  longer  applies.  Orme  suggests  accounting  for  hi  using  a  generalised  error  term 
derived from the initial condition equation. The generalised error is defined as  
E(hi | yi1)  =  kif(p¢Xi1)/F(kip¢Xi1),    (12) 
where ki = 2yi1 – 1, and f(.) is the standard normal density function. The derivation relies on 
an assumption that the correlation between ti and yi1 is relatively ‘small’. Moreover, there is a 
potential problem because the generalised error is heteroscedastic. However, Orme provided 
Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that the estimator performed relatively well. So, too does 
the work of Arulampalam and Stewart (2008).  
 
Another  approach  to  accounting  for  initial  conditions  that  is  increasingly  used  is  the 
conditional  maximum  likelihood  estimator  proposed  by  Wooldridge  (2005).  Rather  than 
modelling the joint distribution of the sequence of binary receipt indicators from the initial 
one to the final one conditioning on the set of explanatory variables, Wooldridge suggested 
modelling the distribution of the binary receipt indicators from ti = 2, …, Ti, and conditioning 
on  the  set  of  explanatory  variables  and  the  binary  receipt  indicator  for  the  initial  year. 
Wooldridge proposed modelling the distribution of ti conditional on yi1 and either Zi = (Zi1, 
Zi2, …, ZiT), or  i Z . His model for the individual-specific component (abstracting from  i Z  
already incorporated using the Chamberlain-Mundlak specification) can be written as:  
ti  =  a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui + zit,  (13) 
so that the dynamic equation becomes 
p*it  =  g¢Zit  + lyit–1 + x¢ i Z   + a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui  +  zit;   t = 2, …, Ti.  (7¢¢) 
By contrast with the Heckman and Orme approaches, the initial state is not modelled. 
 
As  Stewart  (2007,  p.  516)  points  out,  ‘[t]he  estimator  can  be  viewed  as  simply  using  a 
different approximation which has computational advantages’. Those advantages are that the 
model  can  be  estimated  using  standard  random-effects  probit  software  modules  (see 
Appendix A). There is some evidence that the Heckman, Orme and Wooldridge estimators 
lead to similar estimates: see Arulampalam and Stewart (2008).  
 
The  Orme  and  Wooldridge  estimators  were  developed  assuming  a  balanced  panel:  the 
sequence of observations is the length for each individual (Ti = T, all i). However, both may 
be  applied  to  unbalanced  panels  assuming  that  sample  dropout  is  ignorable  –  the 
unobservable determinants of attrition are not correlated with the unobservables determining 
SA receipt. This assumption is ubiquitous in this context and we use it too. We also note that 
even where researchers have found that sample dropout is non-ignorable when modelling of 
labour market dynamics, the impact of attrition is small (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2008 and 
the  references  cited  therein).  To  check  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  report  estimates 
derived using the Heckman, Orme, and Wooldridge estimators, and using both balanced and 
unbalanced panels.  
 
The dynamic random effects probit model may be used to provide estimates of transition 
probabilities for individuals of different types by conditioning on receipt status at t–1, since 
the model implies that the SA persistence rate is:    24 
sit  º  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 1, Zit) = F( (g¢Zit  + l)/(1–r)
0.5 )  (14) 
and SA entry rate is 
eit º  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 0, Zit)  =  F( (g¢Zit )/(1–r)
0.5 ).  (15) 
From  these  expressions,  one  may  also  derive  ‘Boskin-Nold’  expressions  describing  the 
process of benefit dynamics: see Section 5. Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang (2006) estimate 
models of SA receipt separately for Canadian provinces, and report model-based estimates of 
transition  probabilities  for  a  ‘representative’  individual  in  each  province.  Arulampalam, 
Booth, and Taylor (2000), and Stewart (2007) also report estimates of ‘average’ sit and eit, 
together  with  the  associated  average  partial  effect  (APE)  and  predicted  probability  ratio 
(PPR). Their method involves computing sit and eit for each individual in the sample, and then 
averaging each probability over all individuals. The difference between the averages is the 
APE; their ratio is the PPR. Since the calculations of sit and eit control for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, and are the same except that one assumes SA receipt at t–1 and the 
other assumes non-receipt, the APE and PPR are natural measures of the magnitude of state 
dependence.  
 
As  with  the  endogenous  switching  models,  identification  of  the  dynamic  random  effects 
probit model estimated using the Heckman and Orme estimators is best secured with suitable 
instruments for initial conditions – explanatory variables that explain receipt probabilities in 
the initial year but which do not also explain the current year receipt probability. Without 
these, identification of the model relies on non-linearities in functional form. Interestingly, 
Andrén (2007) and Hansen, Lofstrom and Zhang (2006) appear to rely on functional form 
assumptions  for  identification  –  instruments  for  the  initial  conditions  equation  are  not 
mentioned.
17  Arulampalam,  Booth  and  Taylor  (2000)  and  Stewart  (2007)  use  pre-sample 
information about family background and early labour market experiences as instruments, 
and so do we. 
 
Overall,  there  is  little  to  choose  between  lagged  dependent  variable  and  endogenous 
switching models taking into account both flexibility of specification and ease of estimation. 
However, lagged dependent variable models have been the models most commonly used in 
applications to social assistance benefit dynamics, and also used to study related phenomena 
such as unemployment and poverty dynamics. So, they are the ones we use in this research. 
 
 
4. Sample selection criteria and explanatory variables 
 
Sample selection criteria 
 
We have access to fifteen waves of BHPS data,
18 so our analysis data set may contain up to a 
maximum of 15 observations per individual on social assistance benefit participation and 
other variables. At least two consecutive waves of data are required to estimate any of the 
models of dynamics. Individuals may join the panel at wave 1 (survey year 1991) if they are 
original sample respondents.
19 They join the panel at later waves if they are the children of 
                                                 
17 Biewen (2004) and Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) rely on a version of the Wooldridge estimator. Because 
initial conditions are not modelled, instruments are not required.  
18 See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/ for BHPS documentation and information about how to access the 
data. 
19 We do not use observations from the extension samples for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. See n. 9.   25 
original  sample  members  and  become  respondent  adults  in  their  own  right,  or  join  (and 
remain with) a household containing an original sample respondent e.g. through marriage to 
that respondent. We track individuals from when they are first observed as BHPS respondents 
until the first wave at which they drop out of the panel, either completely non-responding or 
with item non-response of sufficient degree that the individual’s data cannot be used for 
estimation.  If  individuals  rejoin  the  panel  at  some  later  wave,  leading  to  gaps  in  benefit 
receipt  sequences,  we  exclude  them  because  taking  account  of  intermittent  participation 
complicates modelling substantially (especially initial conditions). Thus, we focus on what is 
known as the ‘absorbing attrition’ case. 
 
The sample used for the empirical analysis was restricted to individuals of working age and 
not in full-time education (see earlier), and not missing data on some important explanatory 
variables. The sample selection criteria, applied sequentially, are summarized in Table 2, 
together with the numbers of person-year observation excluded by each selection. The basic 
estimation  sample  comprises  75,988  person-wave  observations  for  9,036  adults.  The 
minimum value of Ti is 2 and the maximum value is 15. The majority of the sequences start at 
wave 1 (5,067 out of 9,036, i.e. 56% of all adults in the sample), but there are sequences that 
begin at each subsequent wave as well (roughly 200–300 adults each year). 
 
Table 2 
Sample selection criteria and sample numbers 
Sample selection criteria (sequential)  Number of person-year 
observations 
  Excluded  Remaining 
Full BHPS sample (15 waves; all individuals in 
households in the original 1991 sample, or in split-off 
households in later waves 
  187, 563 
Less      
Missing benefit unit type information  109  187,454 
Dependent children  43,184  144,270 
Respondent aged < 25 or > 59   53,332  90,938 
Spouse (if present) aged < 25 or > 59   4,926  86,012 
Adults in benefit units with at least 1 full-time student  1,322  84,690 
Missing unemployment rate information  17  84,673 
Gaps in response sequence  6,270  78,403 
Respondent at only one wave  2,415  75,988 
The analysis subsample of 75,988 person-wave observations relates to 9,036 adults. 
 
Unbalanced versus balanced panels 
 
There  are  9,036  adults  in  our  analysis  data  set  but  only  22%  of  them  –  1,996  adults 
contributing  29,940  person-wave  observations  –  were  respondents  at  all  fifteen  waves. 
Clearly,  restricting  analysis  to  a  fifteen-wave  balanced  panel  reduces  sample  numbers 
substantially, thereby reducing the precision of parameter estimates, other things being equal. 
Another  problem  is  that  a  balanced  sample  may  be  a  non-random  sub-sample  of  all 
respondents (unobserved characteristics associated with retention may be associated with the 
unobserved characteristics that raise the probability of receiving social assistance). We work 
with an unbalanced sample for most analysis but check robustness by re-estimating some 
models using a fifteen-wave balanced panel. With our unbalanced panel we are able to cover 
a longer period in calendar time, during which there were major changes to the British benefit   26 
system and, in respect of attrition, we are less selective. Our practice differs from that of 
other researchers, however. 
 
The social assistance dynamics papers by Andrén (2007), and Hansen, Lofstrom, and Zhang 
(2006), use balanced panels. Hansen and Lofstrom (2006, p.7) state explicitly that they used a 
balanced panel to derive the estimates reported, but also say that they estimated the model 
with an unbalanced panel as a sensitivity check. Our fifteen-year period is longer than in 
these studies – 10 years in the Swedish studies, and six years for the Canadian one. Stewart’s 
(2007) authoritative study of individual unemployment dynamics used a balanced six-wave 
panel of 3,060 adults drawn from the BHPS waves 1–6. Biewen (2004) used a balanced panel 
of  2,427  men  from  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel,  survey  years  1991–2001. 
Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) used an unbalanced panel from waves 1–5 of the 
BHPS, but report that using a balanced panel led to ‘unaltered’ conclusions. 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Our  explanatory  variables  other  than  lagged  SA  receipt  status  –  i.e.  the  measures  of 
characteristics that comprise Zit – are of four main types. First, there are individual-level 
variables,  which  summarize  characteristics  of  the  respondent,  plus  his  or  her  spouse  (if 
present in the benefit unit). Second, there are benefit unit-level variables that take the same 
value for each adult within the same benefit unit. Third, there are the longitudinally-averaged 
variables  derived  for  each  individual  from  the  first  two  types  of  variable,  and  used  to 
implement the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach. Fourth and finally, there are variables taking 
account of variations in receipt probabilities with calendar time that are not captured by other 
variables.  
 
The set of variables used is similar to those used in previous studies of social assistance 
dynamics.  The  main  differences  arise  partly  as  a  consequence  of  our  differing  samples. 
Because we have potentially more than one adult per benefit unit in the sample, we take 
account of spousal characteristics as well as those of respondents. And because our data span 
a longer time period, we give greater attention to accounting for time trends. 
 
The individual-level variables used to summarise the characteristics of a respondent, and of a 
spouse (if present) are as follows: 
·  Age (in years) as at 1
st December of the year prior to the survey year. 
·  Sex: whether the respondent is female or not. 
·  Educational qualifications. We distinguish between four categories: none, low, high, and 
missing. Low refers to having CSE(s) and/or O-levels; high refers to having A-level(s) or 
higher qualifications such as a degree. There is a non-negligible fraction of respondents 
with missing data on educational qualifications (see below). These are mostly respondents 
for whom only a proxy interview was gained – there was sufficient information derived 
about  other  characteristics  of  the  individual  from  the  proxy  respondent  so  that  the 
individual could be included in the sample. The missing qualifications indicator is better 
interpreted  as  a  control  for  response  propensity  than  as  a  measure  of  educational 
qualifications. 
·  Health problems (respondent only): whether someone stated that s/he experiences any 
health problems. Respondents are asked whether they have any of 13 health problems or   27 
disabilities listed on a showcard.
20 We used this measure rather than any other of the 
health measures in the BHPS as only this one was available at each interview waves 1–15. 
 
We also considered ethnic minority group membership as an explanatory variable, but have 
chosen not to, primarily because the large number of such groups meant that there were small 
cell size problems. Cell size problems cannot be overcome by simply  pooling groups. A 
simple distinction between, UK and foreign born, or between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’, say, 
does not do justice to the large degree of diversity between the many groups in the UK. There 
is a large number of non-white groups (each with very few representatives in the BHPS 
sample), and they have diverse experiences. Moreover many members of ethnic minority 
groups are UK-born and UK citizens. (And a number of ‘white’ people are not.) Spouse’s 
health was dropped after preliminary analysis indicated it was never statistically significant. 
For  the  same  reason,  we  also  dropped  any  differentiation  between  legally  marriages  and 
cohabiting unions. (Assessments of benefit eligibility also make no distinction.) For brevity, 
we shall refer to both types of partnership as ‘married’. 
 
The benefit unit-level variables are as follows: 
·  Presence  of  dependent  children  in  the  benefit  unit:  binary  indicators  for  whether  the 
number of children present is zero, one, two, or three or more, and whether the age of the 
youngest child is less than five years. 
·  Benefit unit type: binary indicators for whether a single adult, couple (legally married or 
cohabiting), or a lone parent unit. These variables can also be interpreted as characterizing 
interactions between marital status and presence of children. 
·  Region: whether the respondent lives in inner or outer London. There are 18 regions that 
can be distinguished in the BHPS but we focus on differences between London and the 
rest  of  the  country.  This  was  the  key  distinction  that  was  apparent  from  preliminary 
analyses. 
·  Housing  tenure:  whether  the  respondent  lived  in  owner-occupied  housing  rather  than 
some other tenure. 
·  Unemployment rate (%). Our measure is the ratio of the number of unemployed to the 
number in the labour force for the respondent’s travel-to-work area (TTWA) at the time 
of the interview, derived from JUVOS sources.
21 This is a measure of local labour market 
tightness.  The  series  is  not  entirely  comparable  over  time  because  of  changes  in 
definitions during the 1990s (consistent series were used for waves 1–5 and for waves 6–
15) but the changes do not appear to have had an impact on estimates (see also the trends 
reported in Table 3). Another potential problem is that data could not be matched in for a 
minority of cases. To address this issue, we used respondent-specific linear interpolations 
for wave t based on the respondent-specific rates for wave t–1 and wave t+1. For the cases 
remaining with missing unemployment rate data, we imputed values using the average 
rate  for  the  respondent’s  region  for  that  survey  year.  Nineteen  cases  for  whom  no 
imputation was possible (data on region was missing) were dropped: see Table 2. 
                                                 
20 The problems or disabilities refer to: (1) Problems or disability connected with: arms, legs, hands, feet, back, 
or neck (including arthritis and rheumatism); (2) Difficulty in seeing (other than needing glasses to read normal 
size  print);  (3)  Difficulty  in  hearing;  (4)  Skin  conditions/allergies;  (5)  Chest/breathing  problems,  asthma, 
bronchitis; (6) Heart/blood pressure or blood circulation problems; (7) Stomach/liver/kidneys; (8) Diabetes; (9) 
Anxiety, depression or bad nerves; (10) Alcohol or drug related problems; (11) Epilepsy; (12) Migraine or 
frequent headaches; (13) Other health problems.  
21 JUVOS: the Joint Unemployment & Vacancies Operating System Cohort (a 5% sample of all conputerised 
claims for unemployment-related benefits selected by reference to a claimants’s National Insurance Number). 
See e.g. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Analysis.asp?vlnk=224&More=Y    28 
Considered  in  preliminary  analysis  but  later  dropped  was  an  indicator  of  whether  the 
individual  lived  in  a  household  containing  more  than  one  benefit  unit.  It  was  never 
statistically significant.  
 
We  also  consider  whether  the  impact  of  SA  receipt  at  t–1  differs  between  groups  of 
respondents, i.e. whether there is heterogeneity in any potential state dependence effect. First, 
we differentiate between respondents who have been in continuous SA receipt since their 
previous interview and those in non-continuous receipt (with a spell of non-receipt after the 
previous  interview  and  before  the  current  interview).  Second,  we  investigate  whether 
persistence probabilities differ between lone parents and other respondents, on the grounds 
that lone parents have distinctively long spells of receipt. See Section 5 for more details. 
 
The  longitudinal  time-averaged  variables  were  derived  for  each  respondent  from  the 
variables described above (with the exception of age and educational qualifications). The 
averages were over the Ti waves sequence for each individual. 
 
Calendar time is a potentially important explanatory variable in its own right as one might 
expect the various changes made to the British social security system between 1991 and 2005 
to be reflected in the coefficients on variables summarizing the passage of time.
22 Time may 
also reflect any other calendar time-varying effect such as the business cycle (that is not 
already  picked  up  by  our  measure  of  the  local  unemployment  rate).  In  the  basic  models 
reported  first,  we  simply  include  indicator  variables  for  each  survey  year  in  the  receipt 
probability equation. Thus, equation (7) is modified to 
 
p*it  = w3Wi3 + w4Wi4 + … + w15Wi15 + g¢Zit  + lyit–1  + ti + zit;   t = 2, …, Ti  (16) 
 
where Wik, k = 2003, …, 2005, is a survey year indicator variable for person i. The reference 
year is 1992 (wave 2) and its effect is represented by the constant term included within the Zit 
vector.  In  this  specification,  the  survey  year  variables  act  as  intercept  shifters,  and  fit 
variations with time that are common to both the probability of SA receipt persistence and of 
SA  entry.  In  subsequent  models,  we  also  allow  time  to  affect  SA  entry  probabilities 
separately, by introducing interactions between survey  year indicators and the lagged SA 
receipt indicator. (Put another way, the state dependence effect varies with survey year.) In 
this case, survey year also acts as a slope shifter as well. 
 
p*it  =   w3Wi3 + w4Wi4 + … + w15Wi15  +   g¢Zit 
     + (l2Wi2 + l3Wi3 + l4Wi4 + … + l15Wi15)yit–1 
     + ti + zit ;   t = 2, …, Ti 
(17) 
 
To anticipate some results, our final specification is a restricted version of equation (17). We 
find that it is statistically acceptable to distinguish simply between years before and after 
1998, for both intercept and slope interactions. See Section 5. 
 
                                                 
22 We should stress that our ability to conclude that the reforms caused observed changes is constrained. These 
multivariate models provide informative descriptions of benefit dynamics; they are not structural models nor 
based on a (quasi-)experimental design. Note also that policy changes may also have an impact over time by 
changing the composition of the populations at risk of entering or leaving SA receipt (the distributions of the 
explanatory variables).   29 
In common with previous literature, our explanatory variables do not include measures of 
events that might trigger moves into or out of receipt such as job loss or job gain, or a marital 
split or departure or arrival of a new born child. The appeal of including them is that they 
may help better ‘explain’ the dynamics of benefits. The problem is that the variables are 
potentially endogenous, they can only occur to some types of individual (e.g. already-married 
people cannot get married, unemployed people cannot lose a job) and so there are issues 
about how to incorporate such variables in a multivariate model and (related) point-in-time 
characteristics may already incorporate much of the variation encapsulated by these variables. 
There  is  also  a  more  general  question  of  whether  the  assumption  of  ‘strict  exogeneity’ 
underlying the lagged dependent variable models holds. For example, is it appropriate to 
assume that past benefit receipt is not itself a determinant of some of the variables used to 
explain current benefit receipt, e.g. whether living as a couple or not, or family size? If there 
are these feedback effects which are not incorporated into the model, then one can derive 
biased  estimates  of  the  impacts  of  explanatory  variables  and  of  the  degree  of  state 
dependence. As in virtually all the related literature to date we shall assume that feedback 
effects can be safely ignored.
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We  utilise  as  instruments  for  initial  conditions  variables  that  have  been  used  in  similar 
contexts, notably the modelling of individual unemployment dynamics using BHPS data by 
Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) and Stewart (2007). These are individual-specific 
variables as follows: 
·  whether or not the individual’s first labour market spell after leaving full-time education 
was a spell of employment or self-employment rather than unemployment or inactivity. 
·  binary indicators summarizing the socioeconomic group associated with the first job that 
the respondent had. We distinguished between professional and managerial, non-manual, 
manual, other (e.g. armed forces or agriculture), and ‘missing’ (the reference category). 
·  measures of the respondent’s family background, defined using respondents’ responses to 
questions asking them about their mother and their father when they (the respondents) 
were aged 14. Specifically these are a set of dummy variables summarising factors such 
as whether either or both parents were alive at that time and, if so, whether they were 
employed or not. 
 
Summary: the impact of explanatory variables on transition probabilities 
 
Consider first transition probabilities at the individual level. Supposing that the estimated 
coefficient on an variable within the characteristics vector Zit is positive (negative), then the 
effect of an increase in the value of the particular characteristic is to increase (decrease) both 
the  SA  entry  rate  eit  and  the  SA  persistence  rate  sit.  For  example,  thinking  about 
characteristics  associated  with  labour  market  success  (and  hence  non-receipt  of  SA),  we 
would  expect  higher  educational  qualifications  and  lower  unemployment  rates  to  be 
associated  with  lower  persistence  rates  and  lower  entry  rates.  Individuals  with  children, 
especially young children, and lone parents in particular, would be expected to have higher 
persistence rates and higher entry rates. So too would those living in rented accommodation, 
other  things  being  equal,  given  the  positive  association  between  home  ownership  and 
affluence. (The idea is not so much that tenancy itself has an effect, but is a marker for having 
relatively  low  financial  assets  and,  given  the  geographical  concentration  of  much  social 
housing, may also pick up adverse area effects that are not otherwise summarized by the local 
                                                 
23 See Biewen (2004) for further discussion of the strict exogeneity assumption and estimation of a model of 
poverty dynamics incorporating feedback effects.   30 
area unemployment rate.) Having controlled for these and other factors, it is not obvious to us 
what the expected associations are between transition probabilities and characteristics such as 
age, sex, and living in London relative to other areas of the country. 
 
What about aggregate transition probabilities and their trends over time, as shown in Figure 6 
in particular? Changes over time in transition probabilities can be accounted for by the model 
if  there  are  parameters  that  are  allowed  to  change  over  time.  We  allow  for  survey  year 
intercept shifts (see equation 17) which impose a temporal pattern that is common to both the 
aggregate SA entry and persistence rates. Specifying the impact of past receipt to vary with 
survey  year  is  the  means  by  which  differences  in  the  temporal  patterns  of  entry  and 
persistence rates are accommodated. Thus, equation (17) implies that the SA persistence rate 
is:  
sit = F( (w3Wi3 + … + w15Wi15  +  g¢Zit  
 + l2Wi2 + l3Wi3 + l4Wi4 + … + l15Wi15)/(1–r)
0.5 ) 
(18) 
and the SA entry rate is 
eit º  =  F( (w3Wi3 + … + w15Wi15  +  g¢Zit )/(1–r)
0.5 ).  (19) 
If estimates of the w parameters are smaller for later survey years, SA entry and persistence 
rates decline over time. If estimates of the l parameters decline with time, the SA persistence 
rate declines over time. 
 
Changes  in  the  distribution  of  characteristics  over  time  among  the  populations  at  risk  of 
benefit entry and exit may also explain trends in aggregate transition rates. The aggregate SA 
entry  rate  rises  or  falls  depending  on  whether  there  is  an  increase  or  a  decrease  in  the 
proportion of current SA non-recipients with characteristics making them relatively prone to 
entry. Similarly the aggregate SA persistence rate rises or falls depending on whether there is 
an  increase  or  a  decrease  in  the  proportion  of  current  SA  recipients  with  characteristics 
making them relatively prone to remaining in SA receipt. For example, a rise over time in the 
proportion  of  people  with  good  educational  qualifications  among  SA  recipients  and  non-
recipients would be expected to reduce SA persistence and entry rates over time. So would a 
secular decline in unemployment rates. Let us therefore investigate the trends over time in 
characteristics of the SA recipient and non-recipient subsamples. 
 
 
Explanatory variables and their trends over time  
 
The  means  of  the  explanatory  variables  for  each  survey  year,  and  for  all  survey  years 
combined are shown in Table 3. Panel A shows the information for SA non-recipients (those 
at risk of entry) and panel B shows the information for SA recipients (those at risk of exit). 
Trends for the sample as a whole are very similar to those for SA non-recipients because they 
comprise the majority of the overall analysis sample.  
 
Consider non-recipients first. Panel A, part (a), shows that the average age was 41 years, half 
were women, and just over one half reported at least one health problem. About thirteen per 
cent had no educational qualifications and a quarter had only low qualifications (part b). The 
average age for spouses was around 32 years, a number which reflects the fact that spouse’s 
age is set to zero if there is no spouse present (otherwise the average age is much more 
similar to that of the respondent). Panel (c) shows that almost a fifth of SA non-recipients had 
one child and another fifth had two children, and just under a fifth had a child aged less than 
five years. Four-fifths were part of a couple, some 17% were single adults and 3% were lone   31 
parents.  Just  over  80%  lived  in  owner-occupied  accommodation,  and  one  in  ten  lived  in 
London, and the average local area rate was just over 5% (panel d).  
 
These are averages for the period as a whole and disguise some marked trends over time.
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Observe the upward drift in the proportion reporting a health problem (up from around 50% 
in 1991 to around 60% in 2005), and the large changes in the distribution of educational 
qualifications.  The  fraction  of  the  sample  with  no  educational  qualifications  or  low 
qualifications declined from around 53% in 1991 to 26% in 2005, whereas the proportion 
with high qualifications rose correspondingly. There was a rise too in the proportion with 
missing  data  on  educational  qualifications:  this  reflects  the  growing  prevalence  of  proxy 
interviews to maintain response rates as the BHPS matured. The other main variation over 
time was in local area unemployment rates, which declined from almost 10% at the start of 
the 1990s to just over 2% in 2005. In contrast, the means of virtually all the demographic 
variables (age, number and age of children, benefit unit type) changed very little over time. 
 
With  respect  to  the  earlier  discussion  about  the  relationship  between  changes  in  the 
distribution  of  characteristics  and  transition  rates,  Table  3  suggests  that  SA  entry  rates 
declined over time because of the marked improvement in educational qualifications and the 
decline in local unemployment rates. (These offset any effects that might have been expected 
from  the  increase  in  the  prevalence  of  health  problems.)  The  levelling  off  in  the  rate  of 
decline in the average local unemployment rate around 1997 is consistent with the levelling 
off in the decline in the SA entry rate around that year. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 shows information in the same format as Panel A, but now calculated for 
the  (much  smaller)  subsample  of  SA  recipients.  Compared  to  non-recipients  and  for  the 
period as whole, the proportion of women is larger (60% rather than 50%), and the proportion 
with  relatively  low  educational  qualifications  is  higher  (40%  rather  than  13%  have  no 
qualifications).  There  are  also  striking  differences  in  the  demography  of  the  samples.  In 
particular,  a  quarter  of  the  recipients  belong  to  families  with  three  or  more  children 
(compared to 8% of recipients) and the proportion with a child aged under five years is 25% 
rather  than  18%.  About  one  quarter  of  recipients  are  lone  parents  but  only  3%  of  non-
recipients. The proportion of SA recipients living in owned accommodation averages one 
third for the period as a whole compared with 80% for non-recipients. In addition, recipients 
tend to live in areas with slightly higher unemployment rates than non-recipients. In sum, and 
as expected from the earlier discussion, SA receipt is concentrated among individuals with 
characteristics associated with disadvantage, in the labour market in particular.  
 
As far as trends are concerned, there are similarities and differences between SA recipients 
and non-recipients. For both groups, the prevalence of health problems rose over time, but the 
increase is larger for recipients (from 53% to 76%, compared to from 50% to 59%). The 
proportion  with  no  educational  qualifications  fell  for  both  groups;  so  too  did  local 
unemployment  rates.  There  are  some  distinctive  demographic  trends:  the  proportion  of 
recipients in households with children, and with young children in particular, declined over 
time. There was also a marked decline in the fraction of the sample who were lone parents 
(from 35% in 1991 to 18% in 2005). In part, this might be explained by a shift in low income 
families with children (and lone parents in particular) from receipt of SA to receipt of in-
work benefits, though observe that the decline in the fractions with children and of lone 
                                                 
24 Some of these trends may reflect a selective process of sample drop-out: for instance, respondents with low 
educational qualifications, other things equal, have a high probability of attrition.   32 
parents is relatively steady over the period, rather than changing sharply at the dates when 
major policies were introduced. Another marked trend among recipients is the decline in the 
proportion living in owned accommodation, from 41% in 1991 to 22% in 2005. Put another 
way, the association between SA receipt and living in social housing has increased (as is 
relatively well-known).  
 
With  respect  to  the  earlier  discussion  about  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  distribution  of 
characteristics,  Panel  B  suggests  that  two  trends  in  particular  may  help  account  for  the 
decline in the aggregate SA exit rate over time: the rise in proportion of recipients with health 
problems, and (especially) the large rise in the proportion in non-owned accommodation. 
This  is  consistent  with  a  ‘creaming’  hypothesis  according  to  which  the  SA  recipient 
population is increasingly made up of individuals least equipped for work. 
 
We now turn from these descriptive statistics to the multivariate modelling to investigate the 
factors determining SA entry and exit rates in more detail. 
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Table 3  
Explanatory variables, means by survey year 
 
A. SA non-recipients (N = 70,235 person-years) 
 
(a) respondent characteristics (SA non-recipients) 
Year  Age 
(years) 
Female  Health 
problems 
Educational qualifications 
        None  CSE(s), 
O-levels 
A-level(s) 
or higher 
Missing 
1991  39.69  0.50  0.50  0.22  0.31  0.40  0.07 
1992  40.36  0.50  0.51  0.21  0.29  0.41  0.09 
1993  40.55  0.50  0.53  0.18  0.28  0.41  0.13 
1994  40.56  0.50  0.52  0.17  0.28  0.44  0.11 
1995  40.73  0.50  0.52  0.16  0.28  0.45  0.11 
1996  40.68  0.50  0.54  0.15  0.29  0.47  0.09 
1997  40.87  0.50  0.56  0.14  0.28  0.49  0.09 
1998  40.96  0.50  0.56  0.13  0.27  0.50  0.09 
1999  40.94  0.50  0.55  0.12  0.26  0.52  0.09 
2000  41.11  0.50  0.58  0.10  0.25  0.55  0.10 
2001  41.12  0.50  0.58  0.09  0.24  0.56  0.11 
2002  41.12  0.50  0.60  0.08  0.23  0.57  0.12 
2003  41.30  0.51  0.58  0.08  0.21  0.59  0.12 
2004  41.30  0.51  0.57  0.07  0.20  0.60  0.14 
2005  41.89  0.52  0.59  0.06  0.20  0.60  0.13 
All  40.86  0.50  0.55  0.13  0.26  0.50  0.10 
 
(b) spouse’s characteristics  (SA non-recipients) 
Year  Age   Educational qualifications 
  (years)  None  CSE(s), 
O-levels 
A-level(s) 
or higher 
Missing 
1991  32.51  0.18  0.25  0.32  0.03 
1992  32.90  0.18  0.24  0.32  0.03 
1993  32.92  0.15  0.23  0.32  0.05 
1994  32.89  0.14  0.23  0.35  0.04 
1995  33.02  0.13  0.23  0.35  0.05 
1996  32.88  0.12  0.23  0.38  0.04 
1997  33.05  0.12  0.23  0.38  0.04 
1998  33.16  0.11  0.23  0.40  0.04 
1999  33.22  0.10  0.21  0.41  0.04 
2000  33.10  0.09  0.20  0.43  0.05 
2001  33.14  0.08  0.19  0.45  0.05 
2002  32.97  0.07  0.18  0.45  0.05 
2003  33.29  0.06  0.17  0.47  0.05 
2004  33.03  0.05  0.16  0.48  0.05 
2005  33.67  0.05  0.16  0.48  0.06 
All  33.04  11.09  21.21  39.70  0.04 
Spouse’s characteristics set equal to zero if no spouse.   34 
Table 3A continued 
 
(c) characteristics of respondent’s benefit unit (SA non-recipients) 
Year  No. children in benefit unit  Youngest 
child < 5 
Benefit unit type  Couple  
  One  Two  Three or 
more 
  Lone 
parent 
Couple  Single  with 
children 
1991  0.17  0.23  0.10  0.19  0.03  0.81  0.17  0.47 
1992  0.17  0.20  0.08  0.18  0.02  0.80  0.17  0.43 
1993  0.18  0.20  0.08  0.18  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.43 
1994  0.19  0.19  0.08  0.18  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.44 
1995  0.19  0.19  0.08  0.18  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.43 
1996  0.18  0.20  0.08  0.17  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.43 
1997  0.18  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03  0.80  0.18  0.42 
1998  0.19  0.18  0.08  0.18  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.42 
1999  0.18  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.42 
2000  0.19  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.03  0.79  0.18  0.43 
2001  0.20  0.19  0.07  0.17  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.43 
2002  0.19  0.20  0.07  0.18  0.03  0.79  0.18  0.43 
2003  0.18  0.21  0.07  0.17  0.03  0.79  0.17  0.43 
2004  0.19  0.21  0.07  0.18  0.03  0.79  0.18  0.43 
2005  0.20  0.22  0.07  0.18  0.04  0.80  0.17  0.45 
All  0.18  0.20  0.08  0.18  0.03  0.80  0.17  0.43 
Children’s variables set equal to zero if no children in benefit unit. 
 
(d) other characteristics (SA non-recipients) 
Year  House 
owned 
Lives 
in 
London 
Unemployment 
rate (%) in 
TTWA area 
1991  0.82  0.11  7.95 
1992  0.81  0.11  9.39 
1993  0.79  0.11  9.53 
1994  0.81  0.10  8.52 
1995  0.81  0.10  7.62 
1996  0.83  0.10  5.40 
1997  0.82  0.10  3.93 
1998  0.82  0.10  3.49 
1999  0.82  0.10  3.19 
2000  0.83  0.10  2.76 
2001  0.82  0.09  2.49 
2002  0.82  0.09  2.47 
2003  0.82  0.09  2.38 
2004  0.81  0.08  2.14 
2005  0.86  0.08  2.30 
All  0.82  0.10  5.01 
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B. SA recipients (N = 5,663 person-years) 
 
(a) respondent characteristics (SA recipients) 
Year  Age 
(years) 
Female  Health 
problems 
Educational qualifications 
        None  CSE(s), 
O-levels 
A-level(s) 
or higher 
Missing 
1991  36.98  0.61  0.53  0.43  0.36  0.18  0.03 
1992  37.82  0.58  0.55  0.43  0.34  0.21  0.02 
1993  38.55  0.59  0.58  0.41  0.34  0.23  0.02 
1994  39.16  0.61  0.60  0.40  0.31  0.25  0.03 
1995  38.87  0.61  0.64  0.38  0.32  0.29  0.02 
1996  39.63  0.61  0.71  0.39  0.32  0.26  0.02 
1997  39.75  0.59  0.73  0.36  0.32  0.29  0.03 
1998  39.38  0.62  0.74  0.34  0.34  0.29  0.04 
1999  39.93  0.61  0.74  0.35  0.32  0.29  0.04 
2000  39.70  0.62  0.74  0.35  0.29  0.31  0.05 
2001  40.32  0.60  0.76  0.36  0.32  0.30  0.03 
2002  41.30  0.61  0.77  0.38  0.29  0.30  0.03 
2003  41.16  0.61  0.74  0.36  0.30  0.30  0.05 
2004  40.70  0.61  0.74  0.33  0.31  0.30  0.06 
2005  41.78  0.58  0.76  0.32  0.23  0.36  0.10 
All  39.35  0.60  0.67  0.38  0.32  0.27  0.03 
 
(b) spouse’s characteristics  (SA recipients) 
Year  Age   Educational qualifications 
  (years)  None  CSE(s), 
O-levels 
A-level(s) 
or higher 
Missing 
1991  20.65  0.23  0.18  0.10  0.01 
1992  21.11  0.23  0.19  0.11  0.01 
1993  22.53  0.24  0.20  0.12  0.01 
1994  21.22  0.21  0.16  0.13  0.02 
1995  22.13  0.22  0.17  0.16  0.01 
1996  22.07  0.23  0.16  0.15  0.00 
1997  20.88  0.19  0.14  0.15  0.01 
1998  20.22  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.01 
1999  20.60  0.18  0.16  0.13  0.02 
2000  20.83  0.21  0.14  0.13  0.01 
2001  22.51  0.22  0.15  0.14  0.01 
2002  23.13  0.23  0.13  0.16  0.02 
2003  22.98  0.19  0.14  0.18  0.02 
2004  24.12  0.23  0.15  0.16  0.00 
2005  25.36  0.21  0.13  0.19  0.02 
All  21.80  21.60  16.26  13.97  0.01 
Spouse’s characteristics set equal to zero if no spouse.   36 
Table 3B continued 
 
(c) characteristics of respondent’s benefit unit (SA recipients) 
Year  No. children in benefit unit  Youngest 
child < 5 
Benefit unit type  Couple  
  One  Two  Three or 
more 
  Lone 
parent 
Couple  Single  with 
children 
1991  0.24  0.26  0.21  0.35  0.29  0.55  0.16  0.41 
1992  0.24  0.19  0.19  0.29  0.23  0.55  0.22  0.39 
1993  0.23  0.20  0.20  0.28  0.23  0.58  0.20  0.40 
1994  0.22  0.20  0.19  0.24  0.26  0.53  0.21  0.35 
1995  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.29  0.23  0.56  0.21  0.42 
1996  0.24  0.18  0.18  0.25  0.24  0.56  0.21  0.37 
1997  0.24  0.22  0.20  0.30  0.27  0.51  0.22  0.39 
1998  0.23  0.22  0.20  0.27  0.27  0.51  0.22  0.38 
1999  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.22  0.26  0.50  0.23  0.35 
2000  0.21  0.23  0.19  0.24  0.26  0.51  0.23  0.36 
2001  0.15  0.22  0.18  0.17  0.21  0.54  0.25  0.35 
2002  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.13  0.21  0.54  0.25  0.31 
2003  0.24  0.18  0.14  0.16  0.23  0.54  0.23  0.32 
2004  0.23  0.19  0.16  0.19  0.22  0.58  0.20  0.36 
2005  0.19  0.18  0.16  0.17  0.18  0.59  0.23  0.36 
All  0.22  0.21  0.19  0.25  0.25  0.54  0.21  0.37 
Children’s variables set equal to zero if no children in benefit unit. 
 
(d) other characteristics (SA recipients) 
Year  House 
owned 
Lives 
in 
London 
Unemployment 
rate (%) in 
TTWA area 
1991  0.41  0.13  8.55 
1992  0.38  0.15  9.98 
1993  0.41  0.14  10.23 
1994  0.37  0.13  9.26 
1995  0.36  0.13  8.19 
1996  0.30  0.12  5.58 
1997  0.32  0.11  4.22 
1998  0.31  0.09  3.85 
1999  0.25  0.13  3.59 
2000  0.32  0.09  2.96 
2001  0.27  0.08  2.85 
2002  0.29  0.07  2.67 
2003  0.26  0.06  2.67 
2004  0.20  0.09  2.31 
2005  0.23  0.08  2.54 
All  0.33  0.11  6.15 
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5. Model estimates and their interpretation 
 
In  this  section  we  present  three  main  groups  of  estimates.  First,  in  order  to  check  the 
robustness of results to the choice of estimator, we report estimates of a basic specification 
corresponding  to  equation  (7)  using  five  different  estimators:  a  pooled  probit  model,  a 
dynamic random effects probit model assuming that initial conditions are exogenous, and 
then  three  models  that  assume  endogenous  initial  conditions  (the  Orme,  Wooldridge  and 
Heckman estimators). As it happens, results are insensitive to the choice of estimator, and we 
focus on estimates derived using the Heckman approach thereafter. The second  group of 
estimates, also based on the equation (7) specification, help assess whether the choice of 
unbalanced  or  balanced  panel  affects  the  results  derived.  Third,  we  present  estimates  of 
specifications in which the basic model is augmented with interaction effects that allow the 
degree of state dependence (and hence entry rates also) to vary over time, and also to vary 
between different groups within the population. These specifications were characterized in 
equations (16) and (17). 
 
The basic specification 
 
Estimates of the equation (7) specification are shown in Table 4 (main equation) and in Table 
5  (initial  conditions  equation).  Explanatory  variables  are  defined  so  that  the  reference 
categories  characterize  the  situation  of  a  single  childless  adult  with  no  educational 
qualifications. (The spousal variables are all equal to zero in this case.) The first row of the 
table shows the estimate of l, the degree of state dependence. The first column provides the 
estimates from a pooled probit estimator, in which no assumptions are made about the joint 
distribution of the (yi1, yi2, …, yiTi) for each individual and there is no individual-specific 
random effect specified. This provides consistent but inefficient estimates (Biewen 2004). 
Column (2) provides estimates of the dynamic random effects probit model assuming that 
initial conditions are exogeneous, and the remaining columns show the results derived using 
the three estimators accounting for endogenous initial conditions. 
 
Looking at the Table 4 as a whole, it is striking how similar the estimates are in terms of both 
magnitude and statistical significance. For example, the estimates of l – the coefficient on 
lagged SA receipt status – lie in the narrow range between 1.22 and 1.24 according to the 
three models allowing for endogenous initial conditions (columns 3–5, row 1), and are each 
strongly  statistically  different  from  zero.  Observe  how  the  corresponding  estimate  when 
initial conditions are ignored provides a substantial over-estimate of l: it is around 1.45 in 
this case (column 2). Because the pooled probit model uses a different normalisation from the 
random effects models, each coefficient estimate from this model needs to be multiplied by 
(1 – r)
0.5 to make it comparable with its counterpart in columns (3)–(5), i.e. a factor of about 
0.79 if one uses the Heckman estimate. Thus the pooled probit coefficient estimate of 1.87 
corresponds to a scaled estimate of about 1.47, i.e. of the same order as for the model with 
exogenous initial conditions. 
 
The magnitude of the effect of past SA receipt can be assessed using the concepts of the 
average partial effect (APE) and predicted probability ratio (PPR) explained earlier. We focus 
on the results from the Heckman estimator. In this case, the estimates in column (5) imply an 
average probability of SA receipt at t conditional on receipt at t–1 of 19.2%, and the average 
probability  of  receipt  conditional  on  non-receipt  at  t–1  is  4.8%.  The  APE  is  thus  14.4 
percentage points (= 0.192 – 0.048) and the PPR is 4.0 (= 0.192/0.048). Thus, on average,   38 
and  controlling  for  heterogeneity,  past  receipt  is  associated  with  a  difference  in  receipt 
probability of almost 15 percentage points or, said differently, the probability is some four 
times higher than if there was no receipt last period. These estimates are of roughly the same 
order  of  magnitude  as  reported  by  Stewart  (2007,  Table  III,  column  3)  in  his  study  of 
unemployment dynamics using BHPS data. They represent substantially smaller estimates of 
state dependence than do the ‘raw’ transition rates of SA persistence and entry which do not 
control for heterogeneity. For the period as a whole, the former is 65.5% and the latter is 
2.4%, representing a difference of some 63 percentage points, or a ratio of 27 to 1. 
 
What  other  factors  have  statistically  significant  associations  with  the  probability  of  SA 
receipt? All the models point to lower probabilities of receipt for women compared to men. 
There is a clear pattern associated with educational qualifications: respondents with more 
qualifications are less likely to be in receipt. Among those with a spouse present, a more 
qualified spouse  also reduces the probability  of receipt. Respondents missing educational 
qualifications information (mostly proxy respondents) are very unlikely to be in receipt, other 
things equal. Differences in age and health are not associated with statistically significant 
differences in the probability of receipt however. 
 
The presence of a child aged under 5 years is associated with a higher chance of receiving SA 
but, interestingly, the number of children is not. The point estimates on the three indicator 
variables suggest that having more children is associated with a higher probability of receipt, 
but the associations are not statistically significantly different from zero. The exception is the 
case of a lone parent benefit unit: the combination of a single adult and the presence of 
dependent  children  leads  to  significantly  higher  probabilities  of  SA  receipt  compared  to 
single adults without children who, in turn, have significantly higher probabilities of receipt 
than those who are married.  
 
In  addition,  SA  receipt  probabilities  are  lower  for  respondents  living  in  owner-occupied 
accommodation, in a region outside London, or in a travel-to-work-area with a relatively low 
unemployment rate. (The latter result is unsurprising: individuals living in areas where there 
are more jobs – and so less unemployment – are more likely to get a job themselves and 
hence less likely to receive SA.) 
 
The coefficients on the survey year indicators become negative in sign from 1998 onwards, 
which appears consistent with the hypothesis that New Labour’s policy reforms had an effect. 
However, the timing is not entirely as expected (WFTC was introduced in October 1999) and, 
in any case, none of the estimated coefficients differ significantly from zero. So, there is no 
strong  evidence  from  these  estimates  that  calendar  time  effects  played  a  major  role  in 
explaining the downward trend in overall SA entry and exit rates shown earlier in Figure 6. 
We return to this issue later when discussing the model with an extended specification. 
 
Observe  that  the  time-averaged  variables  –  representing  relatively  fixed  underlying 
differences between individuals – play an important role in the basic model. They do help to 
control  for  potential  correlations  between  the  unobserved  individual-specific  error  and 
observable  characteristics:  many  of  the  coefficients  on  the  time-averaged  variables  are 
statistically significant. Note also that the sign of the coefficient associated with each of the 
time-averaged  variables  is  the  same  as  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  associated  with  the 
corresponding year-specific variable reported earlier in the table, albeit with one exception. 
Living in London (time-averaged) is strongly associated with lower SA receipt probabilities, 
but, having controlled for this proclivity, living in London in a  given  survey  year is not   39 
associated with a higher SA receipt probability. In addition, we observe that, whereas having 
three  or  more  children  in  any  given  year  is  apparently  not  associated  with  receipt 
probabilities, the time-averaged version of this variable has relatively large and statistically 
significant coefficient.  
 
In Table 5, we report estimates of the initial conditions equation. Column (1) refers to the 
case in which the equation is estimated by an independent probit estimator. The estimates are 
used to derive the generalised error term included as a regressor in the Orme model (cf. Table 
4, column 3). Column (2) shows the estimates from the initial conditions equation for the 
Heckman estimator, and which was estimated jointly with the model for which estimates 
were  reported  in  Table  4,  column  5.  Corresponding  estimates  for  the  two  models  are 
generally similar to each other in magnitude and statistical significance. 
 
The results are broadly consistent with those in Table 4, but there are some differences. For 
example, having lower educational qualifications is associated with higher chances of SA 
receipt when first observed in the panel as well as with higher chances of receipt at each 
annual interview thereafter. Similarly, owner-occupation and lower local unemployment rates 
are associated with lower rates of receipt in both cases. On the other hand, whereas lone 
parenthood  is  associated  with  a  higher  probability  of  initial  period  receipt  (with  a  large 
coefficient), being married is not. Observe too that the estimates of the survey year intercept 
shifters are now statistically significant, but there is no obvious pattern over time in the point 
estimates. 
 
The  final  part  of  Table  5  shows  the  coefficient  estimates  of  the  instruments  for  initial 
conditions.  Focusing  on  the  results  for  the  Heckman  estimator,  we  find  that  few  of  the 
indicator variables are individually statistically significant at conventional levels. However, a 
Wald test of the joint hypothesis that each of the coefficients on the instruments is equal to 
zero cannot be rejected: the test statistic is 10.72 with a p-value of 0.065. So, the initial 
conditions equation is arguably on the borderline of being identified by the instruments. The 
implication  of  this  finding  is  that  non-linearities  in  functional  form  are  important  for 
identification  of  our  model.  Nevertheless,  we  are  sanguine  about  this  finding;  we  are 
reassured  because  the  coefficient  estimates  from  the  Heckman  estimator  are  remarkably 
similar to the estimates from the Orme and Wooldridge estimators, and the initial conditions 
problem does not arise in the same way in those cases. 
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Table 4 
Dynamic effects probit models of the probability of receipt of SA at year t interview 
  Pooled    Initial conditions    Initial conditions endogenous 
      exogenous    Orme    Wooldridge    Heckman   
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)   
Received SA at t–1  1.8694  ***  1.4539  ***  1.2361  ***  1.2195  ***  1.2307  *** 
  (0.024)    (0.034)    (0.036)    (0.036)    (0.033)   
Age (years)  –0.0008    –0.0038    –0.0029    –0.0024    –0.0029   
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
Female   –0.0609  ***  –0.0943  ***  –0.1050  ***  –0.1055  ***  –0.1051  *** 
  (0.023)    (0.033)    (0.036)    (0.036)    (0.037)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0517    0.0580    0.0561    0.0580    0.0561   
  (0.032)    (0.036)    (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)   
Educational qualifications                     
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2056  ***  –0.2698  ***  –0.2972  ***  –0.2487  ***  –0.2994  *** 
  (0.028)    (0.042)    (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.047)   
  A-level(s) or higher  –0.3368  ***  –0.4640  ***  –0.5098  ***  –0.4332  ***  –0.5204  *** 
  (0.028)    (0.042)    (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.045)   
  Missing  –0.8152  ***  –1.0989  ***  –1.1942  ***  –1.1138  ***  –1.2154  *** 
  (0.051)    (0.070)    (0.074)    (0.073)    (0.069)   
Spouse’s age (years)  0.0027    0.0029    0.0032    0.0041    0.0033   
  (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.5590  ***  0.6568  ***  0.6798  ***  0.6925  ***  0.6840  *** 
  (0.116)    (0.131)    (0.133)    (0.134)    (0.129)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  0.5224  ***  0.6331  ***  0.6705  ***  0.6777  ***  0.6752  *** 
  (0.110)    (0.124)    (0.127)    (0.127)    (0.119)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.3928  ***  0.4630  ***  0.4888  ***  0.4976  ***  0.4921  *** 
  (0.109)    (0.123)    (0.125)    (0.126)    (0.119)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.0697    0.0709    0.0648    0.0618    0.0675   
  (0.130)    (0.146)    (0.150)    (0.150)    (0.153)   
Number of children in BU = 1   –0.0274    –0.0097    0.0002    0.0003    0.0009   
  (0.051)    (0.058)    (0.060)    (0.060)    (0.057)   
Number of children in BU = 2   0.0021    0.0088    0.0295    0.0292    0.0276   
  (0.057)    (0.065)    (0.066)    (0.066)    (0.064)     41 
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.0292    0.0558    0.0893    0.0925    0.0925   
  (0.073)    (0.082)    (0.084)    (0.084)    (0.082)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.2405  ***  0.2846  ***  0.2997  ***  0.3061  ***  0.2997  *** 
  (0.041)    (0.046)    (0.047)    (0.047)    (0.044)   
BU type: lone parent  0.5451  ***  0.6725  ***  0.7160  ***  0.7427  ***  0.7103  *** 
  (0.079)    (0.089)    (0.091)    (0.091)    (0.082)   
BU type: couple  –0.6253  ***  –0.7376  ***  –0.7885  ***  –0.8337  ***  –0.7970  *** 
  (0.144)    (0.174)    (0.180)    (0.181)    (0.177)   
House tenure: owned  –0.1018  **  –0.1856  ***  –0.2144  ***  –0.2157  ***  –0.2153  *** 
  (0.050)    (0.057)    (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.055)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  0.2752  *  0.3008  *  0.3295  *  0.3301  *  0.3318  ** 
  (0.145)    (0.164)    (0.169)    (0.169)    (0.137)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0288  ***  0.0336  ***  0.0391  ***  0.0329  ***  0.0394  *** 
  (0.008)    (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)   
Survey year                     
  1993  0.0164    0.0014    0.0245    0.0191    0.0264   
  (0.045)    (0.049)    (0.051)    (0.051)    (0.049)   
  1994  –0.0387    –0.0645    –0.0329    –0.0489    –0.0294   
  (0.046)    (0.051)    (0.052)    (0.052)    (0.053)   
  1995  –0.0073    –0.0430    –0.0062    –0.0325    –0.0049   
  (0.048)    (0.054)    (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.056)   
  1996  0.0124    –0.0193    0.0265    –0.0178    0.0297   
  (0.056)    (0.064)    (0.067)    (0.067)    (0.068)   
  1997  0.0097    –0.0273    0.0198    –0.0350    0.0222   
  (0.063)    (0.074)    (0.077)    (0.077)    (0.080)   
  1998  –0.0469    –0.1021    –0.0567    –0.1162    –0.0535   
  (0.066)    (0.078)    (0.082)    (0.082)    (0.085)   
  1999  –0.0484    –0.1183    –0.0715    –0.1348    –0.0718   
  (0.068)    (0.081)    (0.084)    (0.084)    (0.090)   
  2000  0.0414    –0.0228    0.0222    –0.0453    0.0214   
  (0.069)    (0.084)    (0.087)    (0.087)    (0.091)   
  2001  –0.0467    –0.1235    –0.0789    –0.1482    –0.0703   
  (0.072)    (0.087)    (0.091)    (0.091)    (0.097)   
  2002  –0.0422    –0.1267    –0.0932    –0.1640  *  –0.0900   
  (0.073)    (0.088)    (0.092)    (0.092)    (0.097)     42 
  2003  0.0642    0.0006    0.0386    –0.0310    0.0417   
  (0.072)    (0.088)    (0.092)    (0.092)    (0.097)   
  2004  –0.0390    –0.1240    –0.0833    –0.1550    –0.0868   
  (0.075)    (0.092)    (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.103)   
  2005  0.0803    0.0228    0.0623    –0.0091    0.0646   
  (0.073)    (0.089)    (0.093)    (0.093)    (0.097)   
Time–averaged characteristics                     
  Has health problem(s)  0.2321  ***  0.3033  ***  0.3116  ***  0.2744  ***  0.3206  *** 
  (0.044)    (0.056)    (0.059)    (0.059)    (0.061)   
  Spouse: no educational qualifications  –0.1393    –0.1939    –0.1937    –0.2542    –0.1877   
  (0.150)    (0.188)    (0.199)    (0.199)    (0.201)   
  Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2996  **  –0.4066  **  –0.4516  **  –0.4646  **  –0.4530  ** 
  (0.145)    (0.183)    (0.193)    (0.194)    (0.195)   
  Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.2466  *  –0.3309  *  –0.3587  *  –0.3594  *  –0.3629  * 
  (0.143)    (0.180)    (0.190)    (0.190)    (0.194)   
  Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.1998    –0.3619    –0.3629    –0.3620    –0.3643   
  (0.182)    (0.233)    (0.246)    (0.247)    (0.261)   
  BU type: couple   0.0250    0.1200    0.1414    0.1751    0.1273   
  (0.148)    (0.187)    (0.197)    (0.197)    (0.200)   
  BU type: lone parent  0.0159    0.2966  **  0.4064  ***  0.1137    0.4045  *** 
  (0.104)    (0.134)    (0.141)    (0.141)    (0.138)   
  Number of children in BU = 1   0.0722    0.0109    –0.0265    –0.0558    –0.0103   
  (0.070)    (0.091)    (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.096)   
  Number of children in BU = 2   0.0119    –0.0324    –0.0440    –0.0908    –0.0259   
  (0.074)    (0.094)    (0.099)    (0.099)    (0.102)   
  Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3202  ***  0.3748  ***  0.3662  ***  0.2399  **  0.3817  *** 
  (0.090)    (0.113)    (0.118)    (0.119)    (0.123)   
  Age of youngest child < 5  –0.1211  *  –0.1037    –0.0932    –0.0764    –0.0996   
  (0.069)    (0.090)    (0.095)    (0.096)    (0.101)   
  House tenure: owned  –0.5938  ***  –0.7673  ***  –0.7751  ***  –0.6422  ***  –0.8041  *** 
  (0.057)    (0.070)    (0.072)    (0.073)    (0.070)   
  Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.3062  **  –0.3189  *  –0.3489  *  –0.3331  *  –0.3511  ** 
  (0.149)    (0.173)    (0.179)    (0.179)    (0.146)   
  Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0131  *  0.0221  **  0.0229  **  0.0208  **  0.0227  ** 
  (0.008)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)     43 
Generalised error from t = 1 probit          0.4192  ***         
          (0.028)           
Received SA at t = 1              0.8136  ***     
              (0.053)       
Constant  –1.4215  ***  –1.3653  ***  –1.4709  ***  –1.5989  ***  –1.4705  *** 
  (0.102)    (0.137)    (0.146)    (0.147)    (0.147)   
su      0.6402  ***  0.7176  ***  0.7207  ***  0.7795  *** 
      (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.030)  *** 
r      0.2907  ***  0.3399  ***  0.3418  ***  0.3780   
      (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)   
Log-likelihood  –8887.678    –8682.186    –8550.674    –8539.622    –10747.078   
No. person-years  66952    66952    66952    66952    75988   
No. persons  9036    9036    9036    9036    9036   
Standard errors shown in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.. Models (1)–(4) estimated using observations for t > 1 only.  
Initial conditions equation estimates shown in Table 5 below 
   44 
 
Table 5 
The probability of SA receipt at t = 1 (initial conditions) 
  Exogenous    Heckman   
  (1)    (2)   
Age (years)  0.0005    –0.0012   
  (0.003)    (0.004)   
Female   –0.0190    –0.0310   
  (0.047)    (0.057)   
Has health problem(s)  0.2102  ***  0.2546  *** 
  (0.044)    (0.052)   
Educational qualifications         
  O–level(s), CSE, etc  –0.2239  ***  –0.2604  *** 
  (0.058)    (0.069)   
  A–level(s) or higher  –0.4974  ***  –0.5989  *** 
  (0.062)    (0.076)   
  Missing  –0.7647  ***  –0.9503  *** 
  (0.095)    (0.117)   
Spouse’s age (years)  –0.0044    –0.0043   
  (0.004)    (0.005)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.1881    0.2571   
  (0.141)    (0.175)   
Spouse has O–level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.0398    –0.0122   
  (0.140)    (0.173)   
Spouse has A–level(s) or higher  –0.1612    –0.1493   
  (0.139)    (0.172)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.4177  **  –0.4538  * 
  (0.209)    (0.256)   
Number of children in BU = 1   0.2260  ***  0.2320  *** 
  (0.071)    (0.082)   
Number of children in BU = 2   0.2467  ***  0.2768  *** 
  (0.073)    (0.085)   
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.4771  ***  0.5255  *** 
  (0.086)    (0.109)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.1974  ***  0.2405  *** 
  (0.063)    (0.077)   
BU type: lone parent  1.0247  ***  1.2230  *** 
  (0.101)    (0.126)   
BU type: couple  –0.0682    –0.1143   
  (0.207)    (0.239)   
House tenure: owned  –0.6464  ***  –0.7677  *** 
  (0.044)    (0.056)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.0740    –0.0902   
  (0.068)    (0.085)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0585  ***  0.0622  *** 
  (0.011)    (0.013)   
Survey year         
  1993  0.2212  **  0.2535  ** 
  (0.102)    (0.117)   
  1994  0.1872    0.1327   
  (0.114)    (0.130)   
  1995  0.2849  **  0.3142  ** 
  (0.115)    (0.136)   
  1996  0.2900  **  0.3429  **   45 
  (0.118)    (0.145)   
  1997  0.4928  ***  0.4851  *** 
  (0.128)    (0.161)   
  1998  0.2687  *  0.2649   
  (0.141)    (0.171)   
  1999  0.3891  ***  0.3622  ** 
  (0.138)    (0.172)   
  2000  0.3348  **  0.2826   
  (0.150)    (0.201)   
  2001  0.3298  **  0.3317  * 
  (0.148)    (0.179)   
  2002  0.1728    0.1499   
  (0.167)    (0.194)   
  2003  0.3824  **  0.2778   
  (0.163)    (0.210)   
  2004 or 2005  0.4771  ***  0.4727  ** 
  (0.151)    (0.192)   
Instruments for SA receipt status at t = 1         
  Mother’s employment status missing  0.0715    0.0208   
  (0.131)    (0.162)   
  Mother not employed   0.1303  ***  0.1307  ** 
  (0.046)    (0.054)   
  Mother not alive  0.2730  *  0.2804   
  (0.148)    (0.184)   
  Father’s employment status missing  0.2084  **  0.1757   
  (0.102)    (0.127)   
  Father not employed   0.0503    –0.0315   
  (0.113)    (0.137)   
  Father not alive  –0.0296    –0.0551   
  (0.107)    (0.122)   
  Had job when first left full–time education  –0.0795    –0.0559   
  (0.059)    (0.070)   
  SEG 1
st job: manager or professional  0.0165    0.0217   
  (0.150)    (0.173)   
  SEG 1
st job: non–manual  –0.0670    –0.1028   
  (0.066)    (0.077)   
  SEG 1
st job: manual  0.0965    0.0643   
  (0.061)    (0.071)   
  SEG 1
st job: other  0.1559    0.1749   
  (0.121)    (0.141)   
Constant  –1.3653  ***  –1.4793  *** 
  (0.174)    (0.206)   
Wald test for IC instrument validity         
  c
2(11)  27.68    18.77   
  p-value  0.0036    0.0654   
Log-likelihood  –2194.27        
No. cases   9036    9036   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.. Model (1) estimated 
assuming initial conditions exogenous, and was used to derive the generalised error used for 
estimation using the Orme approach: see model (3) in Table 4 above. Model (2) estimated jointly 
with (5) in Table 4 above. Test for instrument validity is a test that coefficients on all instruments 
are jointly zero. 
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Unbalanced versus balanced samples  
 
In  Table  6,  we  retain  the  Heckman  estimator  and  the  basic  specification,  but  explore 
sensitivity to the type of sample used. (Initial conditions equations corresponding to each of 
these estimates are reported in Appendix Table B1.) The estimates reported in column 1 were 
derived  from  an  unbalanced  panel,  as  above,  with  the  exception  that we  only  use  adults 
whose sequences began in wave 1. This reduces the sample size substantially, to 5,067 adults 
contributing 51,509 person-wave observations. The estimates reported in column 2 are from 
an  even  smaller  sample  –  the  balanced  fifteen-wave  sample  of  1,996  adults  contributing 
29,940 person-wave observations. (We return to discussion of column 3 shortly.) 
 
Reassuringly, the estimates from columns 1 and 2 are broadly consistent with each other, and 
with those from Table 4, column 5 discussed earlier, in terms of the point estimates and their 
statistical  significance.
25  The  state  dependence  effect  is  similar.  For  example,  the  APE 
corresponding to the column 1 estimates is 13.0 percentage points and the PPR, 5.1; for the 
column  2  estimates,  the  APE  and  PPR  are  19.1  percentage  points  and  4.4.  (The  earlier 
estimates were 14.4 percentage points and 4.0.) 
 
The  most  obvious  differences  across  the  columns  concern  the  estimates  for  the  local 
unemployment rate and for the survey year indicators. The local unemployment rate loses 
statistical significance (absolute t-ratios, not shown, are smaller) but, on the other hand, the 
survey year dummies are now jointly statistically significant and their coefficients tend to be 
larger (more negative) towards the end of the period compared to the beginning – which is 
consistent with the downward trend in unemployment rates over the period (and the declining 
SA exit and entry shown in Figure 6). This raises the question whether it is more difficult to 
identify separate effects of time and unemployment rates for these samples – there may be 
less independent variation in the series, and the sample sizes are smaller.  
 
The  other  noticeable  difference  from  the  results  discussed  earlier  concerns  the  initial 
conditions  estimates  for  the  unbalanced  sample  with  all  sequences  starting  at  wave  3. 
According  to  the  Wald  test,  instrument  validity  is  now  not  rejected  at  the  1%  level  of 
significance (the p-value is 0.020). On the other hand, for the fifteen wave balanced panel the 
p-value for the test is 0.94.  
 
Notwithstanding these results, the coefficient estimates are close to those derived using the 
Wooldridge and Orme estimators (not shown). So, our overall conclusion is that the choice of 
sample does not have a major impact on the conclusions drawn. We therefore proceed to 
investigate variations on the basic specification using the complete unbalanced panel. 
                                                 
25 We also applied the Orme and Wooldridge estimators to these two samples, and the estimates were similar to 
their Heckman estimator counterparts. The estimates are not reported for brevity.   47 
 
Table 6 
Dynamic effects probit models of the probability of receipt of SA at year t survey interview  
(Heckman estimator), by type of estimation sample 
  
Unbalanced 
panel, all 
sequences start at 
wave 1 
Fifteen-wave 
balanced panel 
Unbalanced 
panel, excluding 
sequences with 
continuous 
receipt 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Received SA at t–1  1.2542  ***  1.3553  ***  0.5025  *** 
  (0.042)    (0.058)    (0.055)   
Age (years)  –0.0045    0.0006    –0.0064  *** 
  (0.004)    (0.007)    (0.002)   
Female  –0.0837  *  –0.0285    –0.0871  *** 
  (0.045)    (0.066)    (0.032)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0567    0.0368    0.0539   
  (0.044)    (0.062)    (0.043)   
Educational qualifications             
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2530  ***  –0.2653  ***  –0.1642  *** 
  (0.055)    (0.083)    (0.044)   
  A-level(s) or higher  –0.4325  ***  –0.4334  ***  –0.2756  *** 
  (0.054)    (0.081)    (0.044)   
  Missing  –1.2007  ***  –0.9469  ***  –0.7906  *** 
  (0.089)    (0.152)    (0.077)   
Spouse’s age (years)  0.0045    0.0094    0.0012   
  (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.003)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.8555  ***  0.7362  ***  0.3742  ** 
  (0.148)    (0.217)    (0.159)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  0.9399  ***  0.8745  ***  0.3377  ** 
  (0.143)    (0.200)    (0.150)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.7161  ***  0.5776  ***  0.2864  * 
  (0.143)    (0.200)    (0.148)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.2544    0.1351    –0.0747   
  (0.182)    (0.249)    (0.178)   
Number of children in BU = 1  0.0018    –0.0941    –0.0159   
  (0.065)    (0.080)    (0.066)   
Number of children in BU = 2  0.0215    –0.1218    –0.0466   
  (0.075)    (0.095)    (0.073)   
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.1013    –0.0077    0.0477   
  (0.097)    (0.119)    (0.097)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.3051  ***  0.2297  ***  0.2564  *** 
  (0.056)    (0.067)    (0.055)   
BU type: lone parent  0.5723  ***  0.7557  ***  0.6276  *** 
  (0.100)    (0.129)    (0.105)   
BU type: couple  –1.1259  ***  –1.0232  ***  –0.3429  * 
  (0.226)    (0.334)    (0.196)   
House tenure: owned  –0.2836  ***  –0.2796  ***  –0.1306  ** 
  (0.073)    (0.096)    (0.063)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  0.2288    0.2148    0.2797  ** 
  (0.177)    (0.237)    (0.133)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0212  *  0.0153    0.0376  *** 
  (0.013)    (0.021)    (0.011)   
Survey year             
  1993  0.0461    –0.0119    0.0403     48 
  (0.052)    (0.085)    (0.054)   
  1994  –0.0702    –0.1679  *  –0.0377   
  (0.057)    (0.093)    (0.058)   
  1995  –0.0611    –0.0497    –0.0375   
  (0.063)    (0.099)    (0.061)   
  1996  –0.1021    –0.2672  **  –0.0168   
  (0.078)    (0.129)    (0.074)   
  1997  –0.1255    –0.2812  *  0.0269   
  (0.093)    (0.154)    (0.083)   
  1998  –0.2999  ***  –0.4693  ***  –0.1088   
  (0.106)    (0.171)    (0.089)   
  1999  –0.2327  **  –0.4434  **  –0.1286   
  (0.111)    (0.185)    (0.096)   
  2000  –0.0822    –0.2920    –0.1356   
  (0.112)    (0.190)    (0.098)   
  2001  –0.2529  **  –0.4165  **  –0.3185  *** 
  (0.123)    (0.194)    (0.105)   
  2002  –0.2414  **  –0.5268  ***  –0.2159  ** 
  (0.120)    (0.196)    (0.101)   
  2003  –0.0982    –0.3150    –0.1236   
  (0.124)    (0.198)    (0.100)   
  2004  –0.3493  **  –0.6258  ***  –0.2361  ** 
  (0.143)    (0.224)    (0.108)   
  2005  –0.2016    –0.4505  **  –0.0743   
  (0.133)    (0.208)    (0.100)   
Time-averaged characteristics             
  Has health problem(s)  0.3139  ***  0.2523  **  0.1736  *** 
  (0.075)    (0.109)    (0.060)   
  Spouse: no educational qualifications  –0.0257    0.4413    0.0182   
  (0.252)    (0.428)    (0.210)   
  Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.3421    0.0214    –0.0760   
  (0.250)    (0.409)    (0.206)   
  Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.2429    0.2501    –0.1113   
  (0.248)    (0.407)    (0.202)   
  Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.1441    0.4950    –0.0703   
  (0.327)    (0.497)    (0.263)   
  BU type: couple  0.0562    –0.4023    –0.0453   
  (0.253)    (0.422)    (0.208)   
  BU type: lone parent  0.5321  ***  0.4080    –0.0015   
  (0.172)    (0.258)    (0.153)   
  Number of children in BU = 1  0.0737    0.1499    –0.0881   
  (0.121)    (0.186)    (0.096)   
  Number of children in BU = 2  –0.1838    –0.1693    –0.0238   
  (0.130)    (0.196)    (0.100)   
  Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3261  **  0.3416    0.1618   
  (0.150)    (0.234)    (0.129)   
  Age of youngest child < 5  0.1409    0.4774  *  –0.1371   
  (0.143)    (0.251)    (0.104)   
  House tenure: owned  –0.6352  ***  –0.8446  ***  –0.5712  *** 
  (0.092)    (0.127)    (0.074)   
  Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.2017    –0.2067    –0.3454  ** 
  (0.186)    (0.259)    (0.138)   
  Unemployment rate in TTWA(%)  0.0310  **  0.0413    0.0135   
  (0.013)    (0.030)    (0.010)     49 
Constant  –1.4181  ***  –1.4315  ***  –1.4846  *** 
  (0.199)    (0.339)    (0.142)   
su  0.7397  ***  0.6864  ***  0.4442  *** 
  (0.036)    (0.048)    (0.032)   
r  0.3537  ***  0.3203  ***  0.1648  *** 
  (0.022)    (0.306)    (0.020)   
Log-likelihood  –6811.240    –3409.21    –7596.00   
No. person-years  51509    29940    72433   
No. persons  5067    1996    8976   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix Table B1 for the estimates of the 
jointly-estimated initial conditions equation. 
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Variations on the basic specification 
 
We turn first to the issue of heterogeneity in state dependence effects and the interpretation of 
estimates of the coefficient on the lagged SA receipt variable (l). One dimension of this issue 
concerns the prevalence of ‘continuing’ spells of benefit receipt.  
 
Among those in receipt of SA at the time of an annual interview, a substantial proportion 
(63%) were also in receipt at the previous interview without any intervening months of non-
receipt. Put another way, for this group, the association between receipt at interview and 
receipt during year simply reflects the length of the spell. The existence of these ‘continuing’ 
spells raises questions about whether l can be interpreted as an indicator of genuine state 
dependence  in  this  case.  (See  e.g.  Arulampalam,  Booth,  and  Taylor  (2000)  and  Stewart 
(2007) for further discussion.) Another way of stating the issue is to say that the prevalence 
of ‘continuing’ spells draws attention to heterogeneity in state dependence, and so any overall 
measure derived from a sample that pools individuals with and without continuing spells will 
be a misleading combination of the measures for the separate groups.  
 
There are several ways to address this issue.
26 The first and most common practice, which we 
also follow, is simply to re-estimate the model excluding the continuous spell observations 
and to compare the estimates with those from the original full sample model. The problem 
with this approach is that the subsample selection may be endogenous, and this motivates the 
second method, using a bivariate probit random effects model to control for such selection. 
Stewart (2007) estimated such a model though, interestingly, he reports that he could not 
reject independence (2007, p. 522). A third method, also implemented by Stewart (2007), is 
to allow for heterogeneity in state dependence issue directly, rather than by distinguishing 
between  continuing  and  non-continuing  spells.  He  estimated  a  model  with  unobserved 
differences in l characterised by a discrete distribution with two mass points representing 
relatively high and relative low state dependence. (As it happens, the model turned out not to 
fit his unemployment data particularly well.) A fourth method is to allow slopes to vary with 
differences in observed rather than unobserved characteristics. We note that just under 30% 
of the SA recipients with continuing spells are lone parents, a substantial over-representation 
relative to the group’s sample numbers, and therefore introduce interactions between lagged 
SA receipt and the lone parent indicator.
27 
 
The estimates derived when we excluded adults with continuing SA receipt are shown in 
column (3) of Table 6. The principal effect of the sample selection is to reduce the estimate of 
the coefficient on lagged SA receipt from well above unity to 0.503, a reduction of more than 
one half. There is also a sharp fall in the APE, to 3.7 percentage points, and in the PPR to 2.4, 
compared to 14.4 percentage points and 4.0 for the full sample. This is evidence consistent 
with the concept of heterogeneity in state dependence. The estimates for the other coefficients 
                                                 
26 The three social assistance dynamics papers cited earlier do not acknowledge this issue. It has received most 
attention in the unemployment dynamics literature: see Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000) and Stewart 
(2007). 
27 Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) considered differences between those aged less than 25 years versus 
those aged more than 25 years. (All our sample members are aged 25 or more.) Andrén (2007) also allowed for 
heterogeneity in l using interactions with a number of observed variables. By contrast, Hansen, Lofstrom, and 
Zhang (2006), and Hansen and Lofstrom (2006) allowed state dependence to differ by fitting separate models 
for  different  groups  (those  living  in  different  Canadian  provinces,  and  immigrant  versus  native  Swedes, 
respectively).   51 
are broadly in line with those estimated with the Heckman estimator applied to the whole 
sample (Table 5, column 5). 
 
In  Table  7  we  report  estimates  from  specifications  that  introduce  interactions  between 
explanatory variables and lagged SA receipt in order whether effects differ with calendar 
time  or  across  groups.  (See  Appendix  Table  B2  for  estimates  of  the  initial  conditions 
equations that were estimated jointly with the equation reported in Table 7. The p-value for 
the test of instrument validity was 0.06 or 0.07 in each case.) Apart from the interactions, the 
sets of explanatory variables are identical to those used for the basic specification discussed 
earlier. The sample is also the full sample of 75,988 person-wave observations used earlier. 
Because the estimates for explanatory variables other than the interactions are very similar, 
we do not discuss them.
28 
 
Specification (1) introduces interactions between survey year and lagged SA receipt, and the 
variables are defined so that the reference category refers to 1992 for year t (and hence 1991 
for year t–1). The table shows that none of the survey year interactions for years prior to 1998 
are statistically different from zero, whereas all the interactions for the subsequent years are. 
The interaction point estimates for the late 1990s onwards follow no clear monotonic pattern, 
but all are clearly larger than the ones for the earlier years. For instance, the estimate of l for 
1992 is 1.065 whereas, for 2005, it is 1.065+0.440 = 1.505. The coefficient estimates imply a 
larger SA persistence rate or, equivalently, a smaller SA exit rate, in the later period, other 
things  being  equal.  This  is  consistent  with  the  downward  trend  in  the  raw  SA  exit  rate 
pictured in Figure 6. 
 
Specification (2) is the same as specification (1) except that the estimate of l is now free to 
differ between lone parents and adults in other groups, and this differential is itself free to 
change  before  and  after  1998.  Specification  (2)  is  strongly  preferred  by  the  data  to 
specification  (1):  a  likelihood  ratio  test  that  these  additional  lone  parent  interactions  are 
jointly equal to zero is rejected with c
2(2) test statistic 25.07 with a p-value of 0.000. In the 
augmented model, the estimates of l for non-lone parents are slightly smaller than those 
implied by specification (1). For example, the estimate for 1992 is 0.995 and for 2005 it is 
1.379. The additional interaction variables indicate that the estimate of l for lone parents was 
1.479 in 1992 (0.995 + 0.484) but 1.586 in 2005 (0.995 + 0.481+ 0.484 – 0.374). So, the 
increase in l across the period was more moderate for lone parents than for other groups (SA 
exit rates did not fall as much, other things being equal, which is broadly consistent with the 
trends shown in Figures 6 and 9). 
 
To focus on differences before and after 1998, we estimated specification (3) in which the 
individual survey year slope shifters used in (2) were combined into just two variables that 
distinguished between the earlier and later period. According to a likelihood ratio test, we 
cannot reject (3) in favour of (2): the c
2(12) test statistic is 13.23 with a p-value of 0.353. The 
estimate of l for non-lone parents is now 0.990 for years before 1998, and 1.484 for 1998–
2005. For lone parents, the corresponding estimates are 1.478 and 1.598, thereby implying a 
decline in the SA exit rate, other things being equal.  
 
                                                 
28 The most obvious difference from the basic specification estimates is that some of the survey year intercept 
shifters  are  now  statistically  different  from  zero.  But  there  remains  no  clear  temporal  pattern  to  the  point 
estimates.    52 
The final specification, (4), is the same as (3) except that is also combines the survey year 
intercept shifter variables so that they distinguished only between years before 1998, and 
1998 and afterwards. The pooling was suggested by the pattern of the coefficient estimates in 
(3): they become negative and statistically significant from 1998 onwards. According to a 
likelihood ratio test, we cannot reject (4) in favour of (3): the c
2(12) test statistic is 14.84 with 
a p-value of 0.250. And the coefficients on the other variables in (4) are very similar to their 
counterparts in (3). According to (4), there was a clear fall in both SA entry rates and SA 
persistence rates in the period from 1998 onwards, relative to 1991–1997, other things being 
equal. 
 
The change in slope and intercept interaction effects in 1998 almost lines up with the timing 
of  the  introduction  of  major  welfare-to-work  policies  such  as  WFTC  by  the  Labour 
government (in 1999), and the different trend over time in the SA exit rate for lone parents 
relative to other groups is consistent with the intended targeting of these policies on low 
income families with children, a large number of whom were headed by lone parents. Thus, 
there is some suggestion that the introduction of these policies did have a causal impact on 
SA receipt via exit rates. However we would be cautious in drawing such a conclusion, and 
not only because the timing of the change in coefficients does not exactly match the timing of 
the  policy  changes.  Drawing  more  substantive  conclusions  about  policy  effects  requires 
substantially more research directed at this specific question, and is beyond the scope of the 
current project.
29 
 
Instead, we turn now to interpret the estimates further with reference to the steady state SA 
entry and persistence rates, and associated statistics, implied by them. 
 
                                                 
29 An identification strategy based on a difference-in-differences approach would more explicitly compare the 
SA receipt experience of lone mothers with that of comparison groups (married mothers with children and 
childless women) before and after the reforms. For studies of the causal effect of WFTC introduction on lone 
mothers’ labour supply, see e.g. Brewer et al. (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), and Gregg, 
Harkness and Smith (2007). For a differences-in-differences approach to the impact of the introduction of JSA, 
see Petrongolo (2007).   53 
 
Table 7 
Dynamic random effects probit models of the probability of receipt of SA at year t survey interview (Heckman estimator), 
with interactions between lagged benefit receipt status, survey year, and lone parent status 
  Survey year 
interactions 
  Survey year and lone parent interactions   
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
Received SA at t–1  1.0650  ***  0.9950  ***  0.9901  ***  0.9922  *** 
  (0.099)    (0.100)    (0.044)    (0.044)   
Received SA at t–1 and survey year is                 
  1993  –0.0139    –0.0130           
  (0.128)    (0.127)           
  1994  –0.1423    –0.1448           
  (0.131)    (0.131)           
  1995  0.0287    0.0229           
  (0.132)    (0.132)           
  1996  0.0175    –0.0118           
  (0.133)    (0.132)           
  1997  0.1564    0.1646           
  (0.138)    (0.137)           
  1998  0.3200  **  0.3797  ***         
  (0.145)    (0.147)           
  1999  0.4899  ***  0.5305  ***         
  (0.148)    (0.150)           
  2000  0.3343  **  0.4031  ***         
  (0.154)    (0.156)           
  2001  0.5965  ***  0.6431  ***         
  (0.154)    (0.158)           
  2002  0.4436  ***  0.4844  ***         
  (0.158)    (0.159)           
  2003  0.6567  ***  0.6686  ***         
  (0.167)    (0.168)           
  2004  0.3518  **  0.4243  **         
  (0.167)    (0.167)           
  2005  0.4397  ***  0.4841  ***           54 
  (0.162)    (0.164)           
Received SA at t–1 and survey year is 1998–2005          0.4942  ***  0.4789  *** 
          (0.057)    (0.056)   
Received SA at t–1 and BU is lone parent at t      0.4838  ***  0.4882  ***  0.4827  *** 
      (0.090)    (0.089)    (0.088)   
Received SA at t–1, BU is lone parent at t, and survey 
year is 1998–2005      –0.3742  ***  –0.3735  ***  –0.3717  *** 
      (0.114)    (0.112)    (0.111)   
Age (years)  –0.0033    –0.0027    –0.0027    –0.0025   
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
Female   –0.1037  ***  –0.0987  ***  –0.0983  ***  –0.0963  *** 
  (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0551    0.0569    0.0585    0.0592   
  (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)   
Educational qualifications                 
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2980  ***  –0.3006  ***  –0.2971  ***  –0.2966  *** 
  (0.046)    (0.046)    (0.046)    (0.046)   
  A-level(s) or higher  –0.5093  ***  –0.5133  ***  –0.5116  ***  –0.5081  *** 
  (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.044)   
  Missing  –1.1960  ***  –1.2034  ***  –1.1970  ***  –1.1902  *** 
  (0.068)    (0.069)    (0.068)    (0.068)   
Spouse’s age (years)  0.0033    0.0023    0.0022    0.0023   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.6637  ***  0.6701  ***  0.6611  ***  0.6495  *** 
  (0.130)    (0.131)    (0.130)    (0.130)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  0.6391  ***  0.6440  ***  0.6348  ***  0.6245  *** 
  (0.121)    (0.122)    (0.121)    (0.121)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  0.4767  ***  0.4706  ***  0.4560  ***  0.4511  *** 
  (0.122)    (0.122)    (0.121)    (0.121)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  0.0490    0.0540    0.0314    0.0328   
  (0.154)    (0.155)    (0.155)    (0.154)   
Number of children in BU = 1   0.0070    0.0106    0.0110    0.0079   
  (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.057)   
Number of children in BU = 2   0.0388    0.0375    0.0344    0.0286   
  (0.066)    (0.066)    (0.065)    (0.064)     55 
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.1018    0.1178    0.1180    0.1072   
  (0.084)    (0.085)    (0.083)    (0.082)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.3035  ***  0.3021  ***  0.3049  ***  0.2962  *** 
  (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.044)   
BU type: lone parent  0.7356  ***  0.6024  ***  0.5917  ***  0.6006  *** 
  (0.083)    (0.092)    (0.091)    (0.091)   
BU type: couple  –0.7755  ***  –0.7485  ***  –0.7349  ***  –0.7251  *** 
  (0.179)    (0.179)    (0.178)    (0.177)   
House tenure: owned  –0.1978  ***  –0.2013  ***  –0.2014  ***  –0.1972  *** 
  (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.055)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  0.3166  **  0.3153  **  0.3216  **  0.3173  ** 
  (0.137)    (0.138)    (0.137)    (0.136)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0412  ***  0.0417  ***  0.0411  ***  0.0353  *** 
  (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.007)   
Survey year                 
  1993  0.0343    0.0371    0.0399       
  (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.051)       
  1994  0.0221    0.0305    –0.0060       
  (0.062)    (0.062)    (0.054)       
  1995  0.0060    0.0048    0.0133       
  (0.064)    (0.064)    (0.057)       
  1996  0.0493    0.0635    0.0595       
  (0.075)    (0.075)    (0.067)       
  1997  0.0027    0.0133    0.0635       
  (0.086)    (0.086)    (0.079)       
  1998  –0.1200    –0.1105    –0.1501  *     
  (0.091)    (0.091)    (0.084)       
  1999  –0.1830  *  –0.1687  *  –0.1661  *     
  (0.098)    (0.098)    (0.089)       
  2000  –0.0325    –0.0264    –0.0617       
  (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.090)       
  2001  –0.2239  **  –0.2176  **  –0.1659  *     
  (0.103)    (0.104)    (0.096)       
  2002  –0.1783  *  –0.1630    –0.1671  *     
  (0.103)    (0.103)    (0.095)         56 
  2003  –0.0869    –0.0595    –0.0163       
  (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.095)       
  2004  –0.1424    –0.1281    –0.1610       
  (0.109)    (0.109)    (0.102)       
  2005  –0.0138    0.0036    –0.0045       
  (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.095)       
  1998–2005              –0.1693  *** 
              (0.041)   
Time-averaged characteristics                 
  Has health problem(s)  0.3066  ***  0.3080  ***  0.3068  ***  0.3062  *** 
  (0.060)    (0.061)    (0.061)    (0.060)   
  Spouse: no educational qualifications  –0.1544    –0.1624    –0.1598    –0.1510   
  (0.199)    (0.201)    (0.200)    (0.199)   
  Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  –0.3948  **  –0.4115  **  –0.4078  **  –0.3996  ** 
  (0.193)    (0.194)    (0.194)    (0.192)   
  Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.3200  *  –0.3323  *  –0.3267  *  –0.3228  * 
  (0.192)    (0.194)    (0.193)    (0.191)   
  Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.3250    –0.3319    –0.3083    –0.3167   
  (0.257)    (0.259)    (0.259)    (0.257)   
  BU type: couple   0.0883    0.1109    0.1088    0.0955   
  (0.198)    (0.199)    (0.198)    (0.197)   
  BU type: lone parent  0.3506  **  0.3314  **  0.3474  **  0.3360  ** 
  (0.137)    (0.138)    (0.138)    (0.137)   
  Number of children in BU = 1   –0.0167    –0.0144    –0.0169    –0.0080   
  (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.096)    (0.095)   
  Number of children in BU = 2   –0.0404    –0.0360    –0.0412    –0.0340   
  (0.103)    (0.103)    (0.102)    (0.102)   
  Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3639  ***  0.3475  ***  0.3407  ***  0.3560  *** 
  (0.124)    (0.124)    (0.123)    (0.122)   
  Age of youngest child < 5  –0.0962    –0.0954    –0.1002    –0.0898   
  (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.101)    (0.099)   
  House tenure: owned  –0.7926  ***  –0.7943  ***  –0.8002  ***  –0.8072  *** 
  (0.070)    (0.070)    (0.070)    (0.069)   
  Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.3319  **  –0.3330  **  –0.3386  **  –0.3314  ** 
  (0.146)    (0.147)    (0.146)    (0.144)     57 
  Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0222  **  0.0220  **  0.0218  **  0.0225  ** 
   (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.009)   
Constant  –1.4340  ***  –1.4545  ***  –1.4474  ***  –1.3882  *** 
  (0.147)    (0.147)    (0.146)    (0.123)   
su  0.7526  ***  0.7576  ***  0.7579  ***  0.7598   
  (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.029)   
r  0.3616  ***  0.3647  ***  0.3648  ***  0.3660   
  (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.018)   
Log-likelihood  –10709.97    –10697.43    –10704.05    –10711.47   
No. person-years  75,988    75,988    75,988    75,988   
No. persons  9,036    9,036    9,036    9,036   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Appendix Table B1 for the estimates of the jointly-estimated initial 
conditions equation. 
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Implications of the parameter estimates 
 
We now consider the ‘Boskin and Nold’ predictions of SA entry and persistence rates, and 
related statistics such as spell lengths that are implied by our preferred specification (model 
(4) reported in Table 7). The predictions are based on the formulae shown in equations (17) 
and (18). We should stress that these are ‘steady state’ predictions – what would apply were 
SA entry and exit rates to each remain constant over the indefinite future. This is a fictional 
scenario, of course, as we have already shown how SA transition probabilities have varied 
over  time.  Thus,  the  predictions  should  be  considered  as  transformations  of  the  model 
parameters  that  help  illuminate  their  interpretation  in  terms  of  concepts  that  are  more 
familiar. The derivation of the predictions also requires specification of each of series of 
‘person  types’  characterized  by  a  particular  configuration  of  characteristics.  Some 
characteristics  (such  as  age)  change  over  time  and  that  is  not  taken  into  account  when 
deriving the predictions. All explanatory variables are set at fixed constant values. Hence a 
year-specific variables and its time-averaged counterpart have the same value: the effect of 
the variable is the sum of the coefficients on the two variables. 
 
The statistics that we calculate from the model estimates are the steady state SA entry rate 
(ei), the SA persistence rate (si) i.e. one minus the exit rate, the median duration of SA receipt 
for someone beginning an SA spell, and the median duration of SA non-receipt for someone 
ending  an  SA  spell.  We  supplement  these  with  the  calculation  of  the  unconditional 
probability of being found in SA receipt at any interview (which might also be interpreted as 
the predicted proportion of total time spent in SA receipt), and also the expected turnover 
rate.
30 We also calculated mean spell lengths but do not report them for brevity (they are 
larger than the corresponding medians, since the spell length distributions are skewed). The 
difference between the mean and median is a reminder that there is dispersion in spell lengths 
even among individuals sharing the same characteristics. 
 
We begin by specifying the characteristics of a reference person type, and then explore the 
implications of varying characteristics relative to this baseline case. The reference person is a 
40 year old woman, living outside London in an area with unemployment rate of 9%, with 
one child aged under 5 years, married (spouse aged 40), no health problems, no educational 
qualifications (self and spouse), owner-occupier, survey year is before 1998. Table 8 shows 
the transition rates and spell lengths predicted by the model estimates. 
 
For the base case the annual probability of remaining in SA receipt is 0.648, and the annual 
probability of SA entry is 0.341. This corresponds to a median spell length of SA receipt of 
1.6 years for someone beginning a spell of SA receipt, and a median spell length of SA non-
receipt of 1.7 years for someone ending a spell of SA receipt. The unconditional probability 
of SA receipt is just under one half (0.49) and the expected turnover rate is 0.17.  
 
Subsequent rows of Table 8 show the corresponding predictions for different person types. 
For example, if the respondent has A-levels or higher educational qualifications rather no 
qualifications (row 4), her SA persistence rate falls substantially (to 0.490) and her SA entry 
rate also falls. The median SA spell length falls to less than a year (0.97 years) and the 
median non-receipt spell length increases to 3 years. The unconditional probability of SA 
receipt falls to 0.289 (from 0.492). If the respondent’s spouse also has A-levels or higher 
educational qualifications rather no qualifications (row 5), the median SA spell length falls 
                                                 
30 Standard errors for the predictions are derived using the delta method, and are non-linear functions of the 
variance covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates. The fixed values of the covariates used to characterize 
each person type are treated as non-stochastic.   59 
even further to just over half a year (0.52) and the unconditional probability of receipt falls to 
less than one tenth (0.09). 
 
The  steady  state  predictions  corresponding  to  survey  years  1998  and  afterwards  yield  to 
lower entry rates and higher persistence rates (lower exit rates). But at the same time, we 
know  that  unemployment  rates  fell  over  the  1990s  –  a  factor  associated  with  lower 
persistence rates and lower entry rates. The net effect (row 12) is a slightly lower persistence 
rate relative to the base case (0.64 rather than 0.65), and an entry rate about one third smaller 
(0.21 rather than 0.34). The median SA spell length is only slightly smaller than the base 
case, but the median time spell in non receipt increases substantially (it is 3.0 years rather 
than 1.7), and the unconditional probability of receipt falls to 0.36 from 0.49. 
 
Table 8 underlines the disadvantage in SA receipt terms that is associated with being a lone 
parent (row 13) and living in non-owned accommodation (row 8) or the combination of these 
factors  (row  14).  A  lone  mother  living  in  social  housing  is  predicted  to  have  an  SA 
persistence  rate  of  almost  one  (0.99)  and  a  very  high  entry  rate  as  well  (0.88),  which 
correspond to a predicted median SA spell length of 71 years. (This is of course virtually 
impossible, which is a reminder that all these predictions are extrapolations made on the 
assumption that characteristics do not change. Note too that the standard errors associated 
with the predicted medians are relatively large.)  
 
At the bottom of the table (row 17), we contrast this high-receipt probability case with the 
case of someone with ‘favourable characteristics’. She has the same characteristics as Base 
Case, except that she and her partner have educational qualifications to A-level or higher, the 
local unemployment rate is 3%, and her youngest child is aged over 5 years. Compared to the 
base case, the SA persistence rate is about one third as large (0.22 compared to 0.65) and the 
entry rate is less than one fifth as large (0.06 rather than 0.34), implying a median SA spell 
length of less than a year and median non-receipt spell length of 11 years. The unconditional 
probability of SA receipt is one seventh that of the base case: 0.07 rather than 0.29. Observe 
that the expected turnover rate for this person is relatively small (0.06), which happens to be 
the rate for a lone mother as well. But the low turnover arises in very different ways – from 
remaining off SA in the former case, and remaining in receipt in the latter case. 
 
Overall, it appears from Table 8 that there is greater individual heterogeneity in SA entry 
rates  than  in  SA  persistence  rates.  Probabilities  of  SA  entry  range  from  0.061  to  0.878, 
compared  with  variation  in  persistence  probabilities  from  0.224  to  0.990.  The  relative 
importance of heterogeneity in entry rates was also remarked on by Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2004) in their BHPS-based study of differences in poverty entry and exit rates. 
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Table 8 
Predicted ‘Boskin-Nold’ steady-state SA transition probabilities and related statistics for different types of person 
Person type  Pr(persistence)  (SE)  Pr(entry)  (SE)  Median 
receipt 
(SE)  Median 
non-
receipt 
(SE)  Pr(receipt)  (SE)  Expected 
turnover 
rate 
(SE) 
    si    ei    (years)    (years)           
1.  Base  0.648  (0.052)  0.341  (0.049)  1.597  (0.294)  1.663  (0.299)  0.492  (0.072)  0.173  (0.004) 
As Base, except:                         
2.  Man  0.676  (0.049)  0.369  (0.049)  1.770  (0.325)  1.504  (0.255)  0.533  (0.070)  0.173  (0.005) 
3.  Has health problems   0.749  (0.045)  0.453  (0.054)  2.396  (0.499)  1.151  (0.190)  0.643  (0.068)  0.162  (0.012) 
4.  Respondent has A-level(s) or 
higher 
0.490  (0.059)  0.208  (0.041)  0.972  (0.163)  2.979  (0.658)  0.289  (0.063)  0.148  (0.016) 
5.  Respondent and spouse have 
A-level(s) or higher 
0.262  (0.069)  0.077  (0.030)  0.517  (0.101)  8.688  (3.541)  0.094  (0.041)  0.069  (0.024) 
6.  Youngest child < 5  0.585  (0.048)  0.283  (0.040)  1.294  (0.200)  2.086  (0.349)  0.405  (0.061)  0.168  (0.007) 
7.  Has 3+ children  0.720  (0.049)  0.418  (0.055)  2.114  (0.438)  1.279  (0.224)  0.600  (0.073)  0.168  (0.009) 
8.  Non-owner  0.881  (0.027)  0.652  (0.049)  5.467  (1.326)  0.657  (0.087)  0.845  (0.039)  0.101  (0.018) 
9.  Lives in London  0.644  (0.054)  0.337  (0.051)  1.574  (0.298)  1.689  (0.316)  0.486  (0.075)  0.173  (0.004) 
10.  Local unemployment rate = 
3% 
0.541  (0.052)  0.246  (0.040)  1.129  (0.178)  2.452  (0.459)  0.349  (0.062)  0.160  (0.011) 
11.  Survey year after 1998  0.733  (0.049)  0.293  (0.050)  2.236  (0.486)  2.000  (0.404)  0.524  (0.087)  0.140  (0.005) 
12.  Survey year after 1998, local 
unemployment rate = 3% 
0.636  (0.053)  0.206  (0.038)  1.531  (0.280)  3.008  (0.620)  0.361  (0.074)  0.131  (0.009) 
13.  Lone mother  0.938  (0.019)  0.643  (0.054)  10.845  (3.347)  0.672  (0.098)  0.912  (0.030)  0.056  (0.015) 
14.  Lone mother and non-owner  0.990  (0.004)  0.878  (0.029)  71.287  (28.496)  0.329  (0.037)  0.989  (0.005)  0.010  (0.004) 
15.  Lone mother and survey year 
is post-1998 
0.932  (0.021)  0.592  (0.059)  9.801  (3.140)  0.773  (0.125)  0.897  (0.037)  0.061  (0.016) 
16.  Lone mother, survey year is 
post-1998, local 
unemployment rate = 3% 
0.887  (0.029)  0.483  (0.057)  5.801  (1.590)  1.052  (0.175)  0.811  (0.055)  0.091  (0.017) 
17.  Favourable characteristics  0.224  (0.035)  0.061  (0.013)  0.463  (0.049)  11.094  (2.507)  0.072  (0.018)  0.056  (0.011) 
Predictions derived from model (4) estimates shown in Table 7. For the formulae used to generate the predictions, see main text. Base case refers to a 40 year old woman, living 
outside London in an area with unemployment rate of 9%, with one child aged under 5 years, married (spouse aged 40), no health problems, no educational qualifications (self and 
spouse), owner-occupier, survey year is before 1998. ‘Favourable characteristics’ case is as Base Case, except high educational qualifications for respondent and spouse, local 
unemployment rate is 3%, and age of youngest child is over 5 years. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
We have modelled the dynamics of social assistance benefit receipt in Britain using data from 
the British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–15 (survey years 1991–2005), and have fitted a 
series of dynamic random effects probit models.  
 
Substantive findings 
 
There  are  clear  associations  between  the  probability  of  SA  receipt  and  a  number  of 
characteristics. Probabilities of receipt are slightly higher for men than women – unless the 
women are lone parents in which case the probabilities are very much higher. Living in non-
owned housing is also associated with relatively high probabilities of receipt. Probabilities 
are  also  higher  for  individuals  with  young  children,  or  with  relatively  low  educational 
qualifications. Having a spouse with low educational qualifications raises the chances of SA 
receipt further. Receipt probabilities are lower for those living outside London, or in a travel-
to-work area with a low unemployment rate. Differences in age, or having health problems, 
have no statistically significant association with the probability of SA receipt.  
 
The risk of receiving SA in one year is noticeably higher if SA was also received in the 
previous  year,  even  after  controlling  for  observed  and  unobserved  differences  in 
characteristics. According to the basic model specification, the risk is about 14 percentage 
points  higher  (19%  rather  than  5%).  This  might  be  interpreted  as  a  state  dependence  or 
scarring effect of SA receipt, but such an interpretation requires caution particularly because 
it suggests that there is a single effect for all individuals. By contrast, we have demonstrated 
that there are marked differences between groups of individuals. SA persistence rates are 
much higher for those with continuing spells compared to those with non-receipt in the period 
between annual interviews, and also much higher for lone parents compared to other groups.  
 
These substantive findings about the impact of different characteristics and of past benefit 
receipt are broadly in line with the small number of existing studies of SA receipt for Sweden 
and Canada. They are also, unsurprisingly, broadly consistent with previous studies of related 
topics such as unemployment dynamics and poverty dynamics. It would be surprising if they 
were not given the close links between unemployment, low income and receipt of SA. 
 
Unlike previous studies, we have given substantial attention to trends over time in SA receipt 
and transition rates. We have shown that there was a clear decline over the last 15 years in the 
average SA annual entry rate (from above 4% to below 2%), and there was also rise in the 
average SA annual persistence rate from around 60% to nearly 75% (corresponding to a 
decline in the annual exit rate from around 40% to nearly 25%). It was the decline in entry 
rates that was principally responsible for the decline in the cross-sectional rates of SA receipt, 
rather than changes in SA exit rates. According to the model estimates, the key distinction in 
pure calendar time effects was between the period before 1998 and the period thereafter, 
which  is  somewhat  of  a  puzzle  since  the  timing  does  not  closely  correspond  with  the 
introduction of one of New Labour’s major policy reforms to the social security system. We 
have also pointed out how changes in the characteristics of the populations at risk of entering 
and of remaining in SA receipt affected the overall SA entry and persistence rates. Factors 
such as the secular rise in educational qualifications and the decline in local unemployment 
rates would have reduced the entry rate. The growing concentration of individuals living in 
social housing among SA recipients was associated with the declining SA exit rates.  
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Lessons for studies of other countries and methodological issues 
 
We have discussed at length the definitions of SA itself and its component income sources, 
the unit of SA receipt, and the reference period over which receipt is measured. We have 
argued that there are a number of important choices to be made concerning each of these and, 
importantly, the choices that are feasible in the context of empirical analysis will depend on 
the specific country and on the data sources that are available. Changes to the social security 
system, as in Britain over the last two decades, have made derivation of a consistent cross-
time definition of SA more difficult. Moreover, we have shown that analysis possibilities 
may differ depending on whether one has access to panel data derived from a household 
panel  survey  or  from  administrative  registers.  Related,  the  between-interview  histories  of 
benefit receipt in household panel surveys are subject to seam problems that make consistent 
continuous benefit histories difficult to derive – a key reason for focusing on a dynamic 
probit  models  rather  than  a  survival  analysis  approach  to  analysis  of  individuals’  benefit 
receipt over time. Differences across countries in definitions and data sources reduce the 
comparability of estimates derived from country specific studies. 
 
The nature of the issues that are most pertinent or possible to analyse may also be country-
specific. For example, we have drawn attention to the trends over time in Britain in cross-
sectional  rates  of  SA  receipt  and  in  annual  SA  transition  probabilities.  During  the  same 
period, there were also major changes to social assistance and other benefits, including the 
introduction of tax credits. Using multivariate analysis to study trends in rates and policy 
impacts requires data that span a long period of time. The BHPS meets this criterion, but the 
other studies of SA dynamics to date have used data spanning shorter periods. Instead their 
focus has been on different issues, such as differences in state dependence across regions, or 
between  non-immigrant  citizens  and  immigrants  –  topics  that  the  BHPS  is  ill-suited  to 
address. 
 
We have been cautious about attributing the observed changes over time to policy and to 
policy reforms. Although we have pointed to some explanations, a full-blown analysis of 
policy  effects  and  causation  needs  a  less  broad  study  than  this  one,  one  that  focuses  on 
particular policies and particular groups ‘at risk’. 
 
We have added to the small but growing literature that finds that the Heckman, Wooldridge 
and Orme estimators of dynamic random effects probit models produce similar estimates. 
This is useful for analysts because the latter two estimators can be applied using readily 
available software rather than requiring specially-written program modules that are either not 
widely available or, if available, require infeasibly long amounts of computer time. Specialist 
modules  continue  to  be  required  to  fit  models  such  as  those  allowing  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity in state dependence – an interesting topic for future research given our findings 
about observed heterogeneity in these effects. Another aspect worthy of attention in future 
research on SA receipt is the effects of a ‘history’ of receipt beyond the previous year – 
examination of second- or higher order Markov specifications. Another major issue to be 
addressed,  and  which  requires  specialist  software,  is  the  modelling  of  potential  feedback 
effects. Not only may a number of demographic and other characteristics such as housing 
tenure determine outcomes such as SA receipt, but past receipt may also contribute to the 
determination of those characteristics.    63 
References 
 
Andrén,  Thomas  (2007),  ‘The  persistence  of  welfare  participation’,  Working  Papers  in 
Economics No 266, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, 
Göteborg. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/7366  
Arellano, Manuel and Steven Bond (1991), ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations’, Review of Economic 
Studies, 58: 277–297. 
Arulampalam,  Wiji,  and  Mark  B.  Stewart  (2007),  ‘Simplified  implementation  of  the 
Heckman estimator of the dynamic probit model and a comparison with alternative 
estimators’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3039, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), 
Bonn. ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp3039.pdf 
Arulampalam,  Wiji,  Alison  L.  Booth,  and  Mark  P.  Taylor  (2000),  ‘Unemployment 
persistence’, Oxford Economic Papers, 52: 24–50. 
Arulampalam, Wiji, Paul Gregg, and Mary Gregory (2001), ‘Introduction: unemployment 
scarring’, Economic Journal, 111: F577–F584. 
Biewen, Martin (2004), ‘Measuring state dependence in individual poverty status: are there 
feedback  effects  to  employment  decisions  and  household  composition?’,  IZA 
Discussion  Paper  1138,  Institute  for  the  Study  of  Labour  (IZA),  Bonn. 
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp1138.pdf 
Böheim,  René,  John  F.  Ermisch,  and  Stephen  P.  Jenkins  (1999),  ‘The  dynamics  of  lone 
mothers’  incomes:  public  and  private  income  sources  compared’,  ISER  Working 
Paper  1999-05,  University  of  Essex,  Colchester. 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/pubs/workpaps/pdf/1999-05.pdf 
Boskin, Michael J. and Frederick C. Nold (1975), ‘A Markov model of turnover in Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children’, Journal of Human Resources 10: 467–481. 
Brewer,  Michael,  and  Andrew  Shephard  (2004),  Has  Labour  Made  Work  Pay?,  York 
Publishing  Services  for  the  Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation,  York. 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/1859352626.pdf  
Brewer,  Michael,  Alan  Duncan,  Andrew  Shephard,  and  María  José  Suarez  (2006),  ‘Did 
working families’ tax credit work? The impact of in-work support on labour supply in 
Britain’, Labour Economics, 13: 699–720. 
Cappellari,  Lorenzo,  and  Stephen  P.  Jenkins  (2004),  ‘Modelling  low  income  transitions’, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19: 593–610. 
Cappellari,  Lorenzo,  and  Stephen  P.  Jenkins  (2008),  ‘Estimating  low  pay  transition 
probabilities accounting for endogenous selection mechanisms’, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series C (Applied Statistics), 57: 165–186. 
Chamberlain,  Gary  (1984),  ‘Panel  data’,  in  Zvi  Griliches  and  Michael  Intrilligator  (eds), 
Handbook of Econometrics, North-Holland: Amsterdam. 
Enberg, John, Peter Gottschalk, and Douglas Wolf (1990), ‘A random-effects logit model of 
work-welfare transitions’, Journal of Econometrics, 43: 63–75. 
Francesconi, Marco and Wilbert van der Klaauw (2007), ‘The socioeconomic consequences 
of in-work benefit reform for British lone mothers’, Journal of Human Resources, 42: 
1–31. 
Gregg, Paul, Susan Harkness, and Sarah Smith (2007), ‘Welfare reform and lone parents in 
the UK’, CEMPO Working Paper 07/182, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, 
University of Bristol, Bristol. 
Hansen,  Jörgen,  and  Magnus  Lofstrom  (2003),  ‘Immigrant  assimilation  and  welfare 
participation: do immigrants assimilate into or out of welfare?’ Journal of Human 
Resources, 38: 74–98.   64 
Hansen,  Jörgen,  and  Magnus  Lofstrom  (2006),  ‘Immigrant-native  differences  in  welfare 
participation:  the  role  of  entry  and  exit  rates’,  IZA  Discussion  Paper  No.  2261, 
Institute  for  the  Study  of  Labour  (IZA),  Bonn. 
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2261.pdf  
Hansen, Jörgen, Magnus Lofstrom, and Xuelin Zhang (2006), ‘State dependence in Canadian 
welfare  participation’,  IZA  Discussion  Paper  No.  2266,  Institute  for  the  Study  of 
Labour (IZA), Bonn. ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2266.pdf  
Heckman, James J. (1979). ‘Sample selection bias as a specification error’, Econometrica, 
47: 153–161. 
Heckman, James J. (1981), ‘The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial 
conditions in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process’, in Charles F. 
Manski  and  Daniel  McFadden  (eds),  Structural  Analysis  of  Discrete  Data  with 
Econometric Applications, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Jenkins, Stephen P. (2000), ‘Modelling household income dynamics’, Journal of Population 
Economics, 13: 529–567. 
Mundlak, Yair (1978), ‘On the pooling of time series and cross section data’, Econometrica, 
46: 69–85. 
Orme,  Christopher  D.  (1997).  ‘The  initial  conditions  problem  and  two-step  estimation  in 
discrete panel data models’, Discussion Paper No. 9633, School of Social Sciences, 
University  of  Manchester.  Revised  version,  June  2001,  retitled  as:  ‘Two-Step 
inference  in  dynamic  non-linear  panel  data  models’, 
http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/chris.orme/documents/Research%20Paper
s/initcondlast.pdf  
Petrongolo, Barbara. (2007) ‘What are the long-term effects of UI? Evidence from the UK 
JSA reform’, Discussion Paper No 841, Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0841.pdf  
Stewart,  Mark  B.  (2006),  ‘Maximum  simulated  likelihood  estimation  of  random  effects 
dynamic probit models with autocorrelated errors’, Stata Journal, 6: 256–272. 
Stewart, Mark B. (2007), ‘The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low pay’, Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, 22: 511–531.  
Stewart,  Mark  B.  and  Joanna  K.  Swaffield  (1999),  ‘Low  pay  dynamics  and  transition 
probabilities’, Economica, 66: 23–42. 
Taylor, Marcia F. (ed.) with John Brice, Nick Buck, and Elaine Prentice-Lane (2007), British 
Household Panel Survey User Manual Volume A: Introduction, Technical Report and 
Appendices,  Institute  for  Social  and  Economic  Research,  University  of  Essex, 
Colchester. 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/pdf_versions/volumes/bhpsvola.pdf  
Wooldridge,  Jeffery  M.  (2005),  ‘Simple  solutions  to  the  initial  conditions  problem  in 
dynamic,  nonlinear  panel  data  models  with  unobserved  heterogeneity’,  Journal  of 
Applied Econometrics, 20: 39–54. 
   65 
Appendix A. Software and estimation details 
 
All data management, graphics, model estimation and post-estimation computational tasks 
were undertaken using Stata version 10MP2. The main difficulty confronting us was how to 
estimate dynamic random effects probit models accurately and in a timely fashion.  
 
The  main  estimates  reported  use  the  Heckman  approximation  to  estimation  of  the  initial 
conditions  equation  (see  section  2).  The  estimates  reported  were  derived  with  Alfonso 
Miranda’s program module dupr, which uses maximum simulated likelihood methods with 
Halton draws. (This module is not yet in the public domain.) All estimates were derived using 
1000 Halton draws. Increasing the number of draws from 500 to 1000 made little difference 
to the estimates derived. The principal reason for choosing dupr was computational speed: 
estimates were derived for the basic model specification within approximately one hour. We 
also  re-estimated  models  using  Mark  Stewart’s  program  module  redprob,  which  uses 
Gauss-Hermite  quadrature.  (The  module  is  downloadable  from  his  web  page 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/stewart/stata.)  Estimation  of  the 
basic  specification  took  about  15  hours.  Reassuringly,  dupr  and  redprob  produced 
parameter estimates that were very similar.  
 
We also investigated three other program modules for the Heckman estimator, each of which 
uses  maximum  simulated  likelihood  methods:  Mark  Stewart’s  redpace  (downloadable 
from the Stata Journal code archive) which optionally allows for first order autocorrelation in 
the white noise error term; our own specially-written code utilising a ‘plugin’ for calculation 
of multivariate normal probabilities (see our article in the Stata Journal, 2006, 6(2)); and 
code using LIMDEP/NLOGIT version 4 rather than Stata. We abandoned all three modules when 
it became clear that computational speed was infeasibly slow for the sample sizes and number 
of explanatory variables that we were considering (convergence time was counted in terms of 
days). 
 
Estimates  of  the  dynamic  random  effects  probit  models  using  the  Orme  and  Wooldridge 
approaches were derived with the random effects probit module xtprobit that is built-in to 
Stata.  It  uses  adaptive  Gauss-Hermite  quadrature  by  default.  Estimates  of  the  basic 
specification took approximately one hour to derive with 25 integration points. Increasing the 
number of integration points from the default (8) changed the estimates little. 
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Appendix B. Initial conditions estimates  
 
 
Table B1 
The probability of SA receipt at t = 1 (initial conditions): basic specification 
 
Unbalanced 
panel, all 
sequences start at 
wave 1 
Fifteen-wave 
balanced panel 
Unbalanced panel, 
excluding sequences 
with continuous 
receipt 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age (years)  –0.0026    –0.0209    0.0012   
  (0.005)    (0.016)    (0.004)   
Female  0.0205    –0.0122    –0.0066   
  (0.078)    (0.166)    (0.057)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0968    –0.0186    0.1755  *** 
  (0.072)    (0.131)    (0.053)   
Educational qualifications             
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.1588  *  –0.4687  ***  –0.2067  *** 
  (0.090)    (0.172)    (0.069)   
  A-level(s) or higher  –0.4909  ***  –0.8168  ***  –0.4981  *** 
  (0.101)    (0.207)    (0.078)   
  Missing  –0.7866  ***  –0.7464  *  –0.9422  *** 
  (0.189)    (0.425)    (0.128)   
Spouse’s age (years)  –0.0011    0.0016    –0.0020   
  (0.006)    (0.019)    (0.005)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.1182    0.6346    0.3156  * 
  (0.231)    (0.560)    (0.184)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.0770    0.2415    0.0917   
  (0.231)    (0.565)    (0.182)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.2911    0.1016    –0.0222   
  (0.234)    (0.546)    (0.182)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.4654    0.1343    –0.2487   
  (0.335)    (0.733)    (0.261)   
Number of children in BU = 1  0.1907  *  –0.0528    0.1549  * 
  (0.109)    (0.220)    (0.083)   
Number of children in BU = 2  0.1282    –0.0964    0.1431   
  (0.112)    (0.217)    (0.087)   
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.3175  **  –0.0362    0.4526  *** 
  (0.145)    (0.283)    (0.109)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.4290  ***  0.2258    0.2280  *** 
  (0.102)    (0.200)    (0.078)   
BU type: lone parent  1.1871  ***  1.8468  ***  1.1054  *** 
  (0.171)    (0.367)    (0.127)   
BU type: couple  –0.1685    –0.0625    –0.2816   
  (0.342)    (0.856)    (0.253)   
House tenure: owned  –0.7847  ***  –1.0562  ***  –0.6618  *** 
  (0.079)    (0.165)    (0.059)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.0489    –0.4867    –0.0854   
  (0.111)    (0.296)    (0.084)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0543  ***  0.0368    0.0445  *** 
  (0.018)    (0.034)    (0.013)   
Instruments for SA receipt status at t = 1             
  Mother’s employment status missing  –0.1552    –0.2481    –0.3149   
  (0.258)    (0.535)    (0.200)   
  Mother not employed  0.1579  **  0.0373    0.0958  *   67 
  (0.075)    (0.142)    (0.055)   
  Mother not alive  0.2094    –0.4777    0.2393   
  (0.214)    (1.086)    (0.177)   
  Father’s employment status missing  0.1420    0.2038    0.1288   
  (0.193)    (0.371)    (0.136)   
  Father not employed  0.0890    –0.1189    0.0274   
  (0.191)    (0.372)    (0.135)   
  Father not alive  –0.0689    –0.2387    –0.0845   
  (0.167)    (0.302)    (0.127)   
  Had job when first left full–time education  –0.1574    –0.0518    –0.0931   
  (0.099)    (0.206)    (0.071)   
  SEG 1
st job: manager or professional  –0.1119    0.6394  *  0.0155   
  (0.234)    (0.384)    (0.175)   
  SEG 1
st job: non–manual  –0.2903  ***  0.1019    –0.0924   
  (0.099)    (0.250)    (0.077)   
  SEG 1
st job: manual  –0.1136    0.0717    0.0221   
  (0.092)    (0.244)    (0.072)   
  SEG 1
st job: other  0.0206    0.1347    0.2292  * 
  (0.191)    (0.440)    (0.137)   
Survey year             
  1993          0.0544   
          (0.117)   
  1994          0.0246   
          (0.131)   
  1995          0.1334   
          (0.141)   
  1996          0.1868   
          (0.143)   
  1997          0.1627   
          (0.162)   
  1998          0.0375   
          (0.163)   
  1999          0.0859   
          (0.179)   
  2000          –0.1013   
          (0.199)   
  2001          0.1501   
          (0.179)   
  2002          –0.4039  * 
          (0.232)   
  2003          –0.1627   
          (0.225)   
  2004 or 2005          –0.2959   
          (0.225)   
Constant  –1.1130  ***  –0.5191    –1.3565  *** 
  (0.292)    (0.699)    (0.213)   
Wald test for IC instrument validity             
  c
2(11)  22.57    4.84    18.04   
  p-value  0.0203    0.9396    0.0807   
Initial conditions estimates for models shown in Table 6 above. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. Test for instrument validity is a test that coefficients on all instruments are jointly zero. 
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Table B2 
The probability of SA receipt at t = 1 (initial conditions):  
specifications including with interactions between lagged receipt, survey year, and lone parent status 
  Survey year  
interactions 
Survey year and lone parent interactions   
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
Age (years)  –0.0016    –0.0014    –0.0013    –0.0011   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)   
Female   –0.0352    –0.0321    –0.0310    –0.0313   
  (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.058)   
Has health problem(s)  0.2659  ***  0.2604  ***  0.2595  ***  0.2597  *** 
  (0.053)    (0.054)    (0.053)    (0.053)   
Educational qualifications                 
  O-level(s), CSE, etc.  –0.2650  ***  –0.2693  ***  –0.2668  ***  –0.2650  *** 
  (0.071)    (0.071)    (0.071)    (0.071)   
  A-level(s) or higher  –0.6033  ***  –0.6100  ***  –0.6086  ***  –0.6036  *** 
  (0.078)    (0.078)    (0.078)    (0.078)   
  Missing  –0.9621  ***  –0.9665  ***  –0.9707  ***  –0.9777  *** 
  (0.119)    (0.120)    (0.119)    (0.119)   
Spouse’s age (years)  –0.0034    –0.0042    –0.0045    –0.0046   
  (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.005)   
Spouse: no educational qualifications  0.2662    0.2654    0.2745    0.2803   
  (0.179)    (0.180)    (0.179)    (0.179)   
Spouse has O-level(s), CSE, etc  –0.0090    –0.0100    0.0019    0.0053   
  (0.176)    (0.178)    (0.176)    (0.176)   
Spouse has A-level(s) or higher  –0.1373    –0.1478    –0.1385    –0.1298   
  (0.176)    (0.177)    (0.176)    (0.176)   
Spouse’s missing educational qualifications  –0.4471  *  –0.4529  *  –0.4442  *  –0.4439  * 
  (0.261)    (0.262)    (0.261)    (0.261)   
Number of children in BU = 1   0.2318  ***  0.2321  ***  0.2293  ***  0.2282  *** 
  (0.083)    (0.084)    (0.083)    (0.083)   
Number of children in BU = 2   0.2928  ***  0.2864  ***  0.2863  ***  0.2830  *** 
  (0.086)    (0.087)    (0.086)    (0.086)   
Number of children in BU = 3 or more  0.5540  ***  0.5294  ***  0.5319  ***  0.5333  ***   69 
  (0.112)    (0.113)    (0.111)    (0.111)   
Age of youngest child < 5  0.2446  ***  0.2490  ***  0.2479  ***  0.2481  *** 
  (0.079)    (0.079)    (0.078)    (0.078)   
BU type: lone parent  1.2527  ***  1.2635  ***  1.2573  ***  1.2608  *** 
  (0.129)    (0.129)    (0.129)    (0.129)   
BU type: couple  –0.1632    –0.1219    –0.1163    –0.1145   
  (0.244)    (0.245)    (0.244)    (0.244)   
House tenure: owned  –0.7886  ***  –0.7856  ***  –0.7770  ***  –0.7786  *** 
  (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.058)    (0.058)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.0976    –0.0992    –0.0917    –0.0932   
  (0.087)    (0.087)    (0.087)    (0.087)   
Unemployment rate in TTWA (%)  0.0629  ***  0.0641  ***  0.0634  ***  0.0624  *** 
  (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.014)   
Survey year                 
  1993  0.2671  **  0.2612  **  0.2621  **  0.2570  ** 
  (0.120)    (0.121)    (0.120)    (0.119)   
  1994  0.1387    0.1341    0.1269    0.1188   
  (0.134)    (0.135)    (0.134)    (0.133)   
  1995  0.3035  **  0.3236  **  0.3196  **  0.3076  ** 
  (0.138)    (0.139)    (0.139)    (0.138)   
  1996  0.3533  **  0.3566  **  0.3502  **  0.3472  ** 
  (0.148)    (0.148)    (0.148)    (0.148)   
  1997  0.4934  ***  0.5065  ***  0.5000  ***  0.5004  *** 
  (0.163)    (0.164)    (0.162)    (0.162)   
  1998  0.2640    0.2821    0.2738    0.2598   
  (0.172)    (0.173)    (0.173)    (0.172)   
  1999  0.3738  **  0.3957  **  0.3932  **  0.3846  ** 
  (0.174)    (0.175)    (0.173)    (0.173)   
  2000  0.3110    0.3043    0.2939    0.2844   
  (0.202)    (0.203)    (0.202)    (0.202)   
  2001  0.3362  *  0.3540  *  0.3475  *  0.3303  * 
  (0.180)    (0.181)    (0.180)    (0.180)   
  2002  0.1642    0.1728    0.1770    0.1578   
  (0.196)    (0.196)    (0.196)    (0.196)   
  2003  0.2807    0.2976    0.3113    0.2972     70 
  (0.212)    (0.213)    (0.212)    (0.212)   
  2004 or 2005  0.4834  **  0.5022  **  0.5036  ***  0.4912  ** 
  (0.194)    (0.195)    (0.194)    (0.195)   
Instruments for SA receipt status at t = 1                 
  Mother’s employment status missing  0.0325    0.0225    0.0218    0.0275   
  (0.164)    (0.165)    (0.165)    (0.165)   
  Mother not employed   0.1331  **  0.1313  **  0.1276  **  0.1270  ** 
  (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.055)   
  Mother not alive  0.2919    0.2897    0.2847    0.2938   
  (0.188)    (0.189)    (0.188)    (0.188)   
  Father’s employment status missing  0.1857    0.1833    0.1896    0.1907   
  (0.130)    (0.130)    (0.130)    (0.130)   
  Father not employed   –0.0342    –0.0282    –0.0335    –0.0295   
  (0.140)    (0.141)    (0.140)    (0.139)   
  Father not alive  –0.0536    –0.0524    –0.0485    –0.0504   
  (0.125)    (0.126)    (0.125)    (0.125)   
  Had job when first left full-time education  –0.0555    –0.0540    –0.0555    –0.0593   
  (0.072)    (0.072)    (0.072)    (0.072)   
  SEG 1
st job: manager or professional  0.0306    0.0294    0.0349    0.0316   
  (0.175)    (0.176)    (0.176)    (0.176)   
  SEG 1
st job: non-manual  –0.0940    –0.1021    –0.1047    –0.1073   
  (0.078)    (0.079)    (0.078)    (0.078)   
  SEG 1
st job: manual  0.0716    0.0648    0.0650    0.0636   
  (0.072)    (0.073)    (0.073)    (0.073)   
  SEG 1
st job: other  0.2033    0.1838    0.1764    0.1787   
  (0.143)    (0.144)    (0.143)    (0.143)   
Constant  –1.4977  ***  –1.5202  ***  –1.5249  ***  –1.5194  *** 
  (0.211)    (0.212)    (0.211)    (0.211)   
Wald test for IC instrument validity                 
  c
2(11)  18.92    18.33    18.39    18.87   
  p-value  0.0625    0.0741    0.0730    0.0634   
Initial conditions estimates for models shown in Table 7 above. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Test for instrument validity is a 
test that coefficients on all instruments are jointly zero. 
 